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Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges:
Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian
Tyranny, and Direct Democracy
WILLIAM E. ADAMS, JR.*
The world is slowly growing more tolerant and one day men will
be ashamed of their barbarous treatment of me, as they are
now ashamed of the torturings of the middle ages.**
Americans have a very low tolerance for differentness, whether
it's racial, ethnic, or sexual.
Despite our rhetoric about individualism, we are a desperately
conforming people.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Ugly in tone, mean in spirit, and stoked by religious intolerance, a new
wave of ballot measures1 aimed at preventing lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals
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Florida's anti-gay ballot initiative in In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-
Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994) and of amicus brief
in Cox v. Health and Rehabilitative Services, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993),
revew granted, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1994), a case presently pending before the Florida
Supreme Court challenging Florida's ban of homosexuals from adopting children. He
thanks his research assistants, Skip Dirienzo, Daniel Stiffler, Adam Pollock, and Jennifer
Rosar for helping with this project.
** Oscar Wilde (quoted in UNNATURAL QUOTATIONS 77 (Leigh W. Rutledge ed.,
1988)).
*** Martin Duberman (quoted in UNNATURAL QUOTATIONS 108 (Leigh W. Rutledge
ed., 1988)).
1 This Article will discuss the process in which voters create, approve, repeal, or
amend laws or ordinances by placing measures on a ballot and voting on them. This process
is sometimes referred to as "direct democracy." The measures are also sometimes called
plebiscites. See Kovis I. Sirico, Jr., The Constitudonality of the Initiative and Referendwn,
65 IOWA L. REV. 637 (1980). The Article will distinguish between initiatives and referenda,
where appropriate. Some countries consider the initiative to be simply a type of
referendum, but in the United States, a traditional distinction has been made between the
two. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Cawpaign Spending and Ballot Proposiaons: Recent
Eperience, Pubhc Choice 7heory and the First Amenbnent, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 508
n.4 (1982). Initiatives are those measures that are submitted directly to the voters upon a
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from obtaining legal protection from discrimination, is being launched by
conservative religious activists. 2 These anti-gay measures not only threaten
recently obtained civil rights protections obtained by these groups, they join a
newly invigorated trend by groups who seek to circumvent the system of
checks and balances of the republican government established by this country's
founders. A variety of approaches are being taken which attempt to limit the
inclusion of the category of sexual orientation in antidiscrimination laws.
Although these measures raise constitutional questions, many courts restrict
consideration of constitutional issues prior to an election. Consequently, a
number of the challenges being filed to prevent placement of these measures on
the ballot are raising procedural and technical violations. Although important in
trying to ensure that the election is fair and informed, the latter types of
challenges do not permanently remove the issue from the electoral process.
This Article will discuss the philosophy underlying ballot measures, the
dangers they create for members of groups who are traditionally discriminated
against in this society, the utilization of legal challenges to such measures, and
the justifications for bringing such actions to prevent the placement of these
discriminatory plebiscites upon the ballot. The Article will explore the concerns
for pre-election challenges to both statutory and constitutional measures,
discussing distinctions between the two when important.
matter brought by petition from electors without an intervening legislative process. The
referendum is a measure which permits voters to approve or remove statutes or ordinances
which have been enacted by a legislative body. REFERENDUMs: A COMPARATivE STUDY OF
PRACrICE AND THEORY (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 1978) [hereinafler
REFEENDUMS]; James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judcial Review
of nitiatives and Referendms, 64 NaRn DAME L. Rv. 298, 299 (1989). Ballot measures
will be used to include both referenda and initiatives. Although these measures can be
considered legislative in the sense that they also create laws, the term "legislative" in this
Article will refer to the lawmaking process by elected local or state representatives in their
official capacities. See also Columbia River Salmon & Tuna Packers Ass'n v. Appling, 375
P.2d 71, 73 (Or. 1962).
2 Organizations in 10 states attempted to place initiatives on the 1994 ballot: Arizona,
Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington. The
initiative offered by the American Family Political Committee in Florida was struck down
by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts
Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 1994). The proponents in Ohio
suspended their efforts during the pending litigation concerning the Cincinnati ballot
initiative. The proponents in all of the other states except for Idaho and Oregon were unable
to obtain sufficient signatures to place their initiatives on the ballot. This latter failure should
not be taken as a sign of surrender in those states. Proponents promise to be back in many
of them. As Oregon enters its third election on this issue, it is clear that the proponents of
these proposals do not accept defeat easily.
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Part II will describe and categorize the various textual approaches to anti-
gay3 laws experimented with by conservative groups as they strive to find
wording which will resonate most strongly with the electorate while
minimizing potential legal challenges. Part II will discuss the underlying
rationale for direct democracy, outlining the benefits and dangers. Part IV will
examine in more detail the particular threat to persons who possess
characteristics that traditionally result in discriminatory treatment in this
society. The legal problems posed by the current group of anti-gay ballot
measures, both constitutional and procedural, will be analyzed in Part V. Part
VI will outline the rationale for both pre- and postelection challenges, arguing
for the need to allow pre-election challenges, to most, if not all, of these
measures. Although this Article will discuss the electoral process as it is being
used against lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men, the problems discussed are also
relevant to other groups that have traditionally experienced discrimination in
this country.
I. THE BALLOT PROPOSALS
The measures discussed in this Article are all designed to prevent lesbians,
gays, and bisexuals from receiving antidiscrimination protection through laws
and government policies. Some also attempt to further restrict the rights of
members of these groups by adding prohibitions on teaching about
homosexuality in the schools or providing assistance to gay and lesbian groups.
While some use pejorative language about gays and lesbians, some recent
proposals refrain from mentioning the targeted groups at all. The measures
offered thus far roughly fall into three categories: (1) overtly hostile,
(2) specifically targeted, and (3) stealth proposals.
A. Overtly Hostile Proposals
Voters in Oregon in 1992 rejected a measure aimed at restricting the rights
of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. This initiative, known as Measure Nine,
not only identified the targeted groups and lumped them together with
pedophiles, sadists, and masochists, it also portrayed homosexuality as
3 Some may object to the use of "anti-gay" to categorize this group of laws because
they perceive the issues to also include the proper role of civil rights laws instead of
opposition to gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. Nevertheless, the way in which this group of
laws is being used by the proponents of the measures makes it clear that they are meant to
halt the legal progress made in areas that most gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in this society
deem central to their legal advancement. The term also encompasses the broad range of
issues covered by these measures.
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"abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse" and sought to have this view
taught in public schools.4 Since the failure of Measure Nine in Oregon, a
number of local cities and counties have passed anti-gay measures.5 Not
satisfied with depriving lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals from being included
in antidiscrimination laws, they also seek to prohibit other conduct and
expression, some of it constitutionally protected, which might ameliorate the
hostile treatment given to persons based upon a sexual orientation other than
exclusively heterosexual.
A second group of measures omit the hostile epithets, but specify a broad
range of activities, some of which are constitutionally protected, which they
characterize as promoting homosexuality. For example, this type of measure
has been proposed in Idaho, which originally proposed an Oregon-style
measure, but later amended it. This initiative seeks to amend Idaho statutes to
prohibit antidiscrimination protections for persons who engage in homosexual
behavior.6 In addition, the Idaho proposal prohibits the recognition of domestic
partnerships7 based on homosexual behavior, 8 the expenditure of public funds
4 Charlene L. Smith, Undo Two: An Esay Regarding Colorado's And-Lesbian and
Gay Amendnent Two, 32 WASHBURN L.J 367, 368 (1993). See infra Appendix I for a
reproduction of Oregon Measure Nine § 41.
5 Since the rejection of Measure Nine, 23 local communities in Oregon have approved
ballot measures prohibiting the passage of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws, in spite
of legislation making such measures void, and there is an effort to put another measure on
the state ballot in 1994. Sum Rubenstein, OC4, FOE Both Proclaim Vote Victory,
ORE NLAN, May 19, 1994, at E5.
6 Section 67-8002:
SPECIAL RIGHTS FOR PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN HOMOSEXUAL
BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED. No agency, department, or political subdivision of the
State of Idaho shall enact or adopt any law, rule, policy, or agreement which has the
purpose or effect of granting minority status to persons who engage in homosexual
behavior, solely on the basis of such behavior; therefore, affirmative action, quota
preferences, and special classifications such as "sexual orientation" or similar
designations shall not be established on the basis of homosexuality. All private persons
shall be guaranteed equal protection of the law in the full and free exercise of all rights
enumerated and guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the Constitution of the State of
Idaho, and federal and state law. All existing civil righs protections based on race,
color, religion, gender, age or national origin are reaffirmed, and public services shall
be available to all persons on an equal basis.
Idaho's Proposed Initiative § 67-8002. See infra Appendix B for a reproduction of this proposal.
7 Generally, so-called domestic partnership policies and legislation allow individuals to
designate their romantic partner with whom they are engaged in a committed relationship to
receive benefits similar to what the spouse of an individual would be entitled. For a
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in a manner which promotes or expresses approval of homosexuality, 9 the
teaching of the idea to students in elementary and secondary schools that
homosexuality is an acceptable behavior, 10 or the ability of minors to access
description of such ordinances, see Note, A More Perfect Union. A Legal and Social
Analysis of Dw 'vic Parnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164 (1992). Because
states do not allow people to marry someone of the same gender, it is through such policies
that gay men and lesbians are enabled to obtain such benefits for their spouse equivalents.
But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), in which the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that a ban on same-sex marriages could violate the Hawaii equal protection clause. As
this Article goes to print, however, the Hawaii legislature is attempting to reverse this
position.
8 Section 67-003 states:
EXTENSION OF LEGAL INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE TO DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIPS ON HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED. Same-sex
marriages and domestic partnerships are hereby declared to be against public policy and
shall not be legally recognized in any manner by any agency, department, or political
subdivision of the State of Idaho.
Idaho's Proposed Initiative § 67-8003. See infra Appendix B for a reproduction of this proposal.
For examples of similar proposed state initiatives, see infra Appendix E for a reproduction of
Nevada's Proposed Minority Status and Child Protection Act § 21(1) and Appendix F for a
reproduction of Washington's Proposed Initiatives § 4.
9 Section 67-8005 states:
EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS. No agency, department or political
subdivision of the State of Idaho shall expend public funds in a manner that has the
purpose or effect of promoting, making acceptable, or expressing approval of
homosexuality. This section shall not prohibit government from providing positive
guidance toward persons experiencing difficulty with sexual identity....
Idaho's Proposed Initiative § 67-8005. See in.fra Appendix B for a reproduction of this proposal.
For an example of a similar proposed state initiative, see infra Appendix F for a reproduction of
Washington's Proposed Initiative 610 § 2.
10 Section 67-8004 states:
PUBLIC SCHOOLS. No employee, representative, or agent of any public elementary
or secondary school shall, in connection with school activities, promote, sanction, or
endorse homosexuality as a healthy, approved or acceptable behavior. Subject to the
provisions of federal law, any discussion of homosexuality within such schools shall be
age-appropriate as defined and authorized by the local school board of trustees.
Counseling of public school students regarding such students' sexual identity shall
conform in the foregoing.
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books that address homosexuality in public libraries. 11
B. Specifically Targeted Proposals
A second group of proposals do not use terms such as perverse, abnormal,
and unnatural, but still make clear that their targets are lesbians, bisexuals, and
gay men. Also, unlike the overtly hostile proposals previously discussed, 12
these proposals do not specifically target protected activities such as public
education or public libraries. Although the overt prejudice is softened by
omitting the epithets hurled by Measure Nine, these propositions make
reference to "minority status," "special rights," "affirmative action,"
"quotas," and other emotionally laden words and phrases, that are meant to
convey the notion that more than equal rights is being sought by sexual
orientation antidiscrimination laws. The proposal in this category that has
received the most public attention is Colorado's Amendment Two. The
amendment to the state constitution, passed by Colorado voters on November
3, 1992,13 takes a direct approach to prohibiting antidiscrimination protection
for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 14 Because of the electoral defeat of Measure
Idaho's Proposed Initiative § 67-8004. See infra Appendix B for a reproduction of this
proposal. For examples of similar proposed state initiatives, see infra Appendix E for a
reproduction of Nevada's Proposed Minority Status and Child Protection Act § 21(2) and
Appendix F for a reproduction of Washington's Proposed Initiatives § 4.
11 Section 67-8005 states, in part:
EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS. ... . This section shall not limit the
availability in public libraries of books and materials written for adults which address
homosexuality, provided access to such materials is limited to adults and meets local
standards as established through the normal library review process.
Idaho's Proposed Initiative § 67-8005. See infra Appendix B for a reproduction of this proposal.
For examples of similar proposed state initiatives, see ra Appendix E for a reproduction of
Nevada's Proposed Minority Status and Child Protection Act § 21(2)(d) and Appendix F for a
reproduction of Washington's Proposed Initiative 610 § 2.
12 See supra part I.A.
13 Amendment Two was passed by a margin of 53% to 47% despite polls that had
consistently found the proposal to be losing. John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay
Initiaves: A Cal for HeightenedJudicial Scniny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 154 n.5 (1993).
14 Amendment Two states:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
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Nine and the legal problems of the stealth initiative in Florida,15 described
generally in the next section of this Article, 16 it appears that this category of
proposition is the one currently most favored. 17
C. Stealth Proposals
Some of the more aggressive measures, such as the proposal in Idaho, raise
a number of facial constitutional questions because of their breadth. In addition,
the labelling of homosexuality as abnormal and perverse has been recognized as
offensive to some voters who might otherwise vote for such a measure.
Therefore, some proponents of these measures have more recently opted for
initiatives that attempt to appear to take a less hostile and less challengable
approach to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. Thus, in Florida for example, the
amendment to the Florida Constitution proposed by the American Family
Political Committee (AFPC), a component of the American Family Association
(AFA), did not even mention the words gay, lesbian, bisexual, homosexual, or
sexual orientation. Instead the proponents attempted to permanently prevent any
additional classifications from being added to existing antidiscrimination
laws.18 This attempt to use language that avoids some of the more
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.
CoLo. CoNsT. art. I, § 30b.
15 See infra part V.B.3.
16 See infra part ll.C.
17 See infra Appendix A for a reproduction of Arizona's Proposed Initiative; Appendix
C, for a reproduction of Maine's Proposed Initiative; Appendix I, for a reproduction of
Cincinnati's Issue Three.
18 The proposed Florida amendment states, in part:
The state, political subdivisions of the state, municipalities or any other governmental
entity shall not enact or adopt any law regarding discrimination against persons which
creates, establishes, or recognizes any right, privilege or protection for any person
based upon any characteristic, trait, status or condition other than race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, handicap, ethnic background, marital status or familial status.
As used herein the term "sex" shall mean the biological state of being either a male
person or a female person; "marital status" shall mean the state of being lawfully
married to a person of the opposite sex, separated, divorced, widowed or single; and
"familial status" shall mean the state of being a person domiciled with a minor, as
19941
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inflammatory language has been offered for political and legal purposes. 19
Despite the attempt to make the initiative and its summary appear neutral, the
campaign literature of the proponents left little doubt as to whom its primary
targets were and was just as misleading and volatile as that offered in the other
states.2
0
I. THE INTrIA'n PROCESS-DEMOCRATIC IDEAL?
A. Initiatives and Referenda
1. Purposes
The initiative and referendum processes that are increasingly being used in
defined by law, who is the parent or person with legal custody of such minor or who is
a person with written permission from such parent or person with legal custody of such
minor.
Florida's Proposed Initiative § 1(b). See infra Appendix H for a reproduction of this
proposal.
19 David Caton, director of the anti-gay initiative effort of the American Family
Association in Florida, told the press after the filing of the legal challenge to it that the
proponents' lawyers had advised them that the Florida proposal was the best approach for
legal and political reasons. Stephen Bousquet, Groups Challenge Anti-Gay Ballot Issue,
MImIHERALD, Dec. 7, 1993, at 16A.
20 The number that one called to receive the petition was 1-800-Gay-Laws. The letter
which accompanied the petition states:
This petition is designed to stop homosexual activists and other special interest
groups from improper inclusion in discrimination laws.... Therefore, this amendment
would prevent homosexuality and other lifestyles from gaining special protection from
inclusion in discrimination laws.
We have also enclosed a copy of the brochure titled "ARE HOMOSEXUAL
RIGHTS TRADITIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS?" This brochure provides documentation
that homosexuality does NOT meet the criteria for traditional civil rights protection.
Form Letter signed by David Caton, Chairman, American Family Political Committee of
Florida (copy on file with author). The brochure referred to in the petition's cover letter
contains a number of allegations comparing homosexuals to "true minorities," comparing
income and educational levels as well as the percentage of frequent fliers in the homosexual
community as opposed to the others. Despite the vague allegations of other special interest
groups who will be restrained by this measure, none are identified in these materials.
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a number of states21 are sometimes lauded in court cases as models of the
democratic process.22 The California Supreme Court noted the initiative's
progressive roots in its following pronouncement:
The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the
initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the
progressive movement of the early 1900's. Drafted in light of the theory that
all power of government ultimately resides in the people, the amendment
speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but
as a power reserved by them.23
In addition to state statutory and constitutional measures, local ballot measures
abound in an even larger number of states. 24
The purposes of the referendum/initiative have been noted as a matter of:
(1) constitutional necessity-a requirement by some constitutions as a means of
amending the constitution; (2) a legitimating function-demonstrating that
governmental policies have popular support; and (3) a transfer of decision-
making-allowing the people to decide issues which elected officials are
unwilling or unable to resolve.23 The referendum process got its initial impetus
in this country from persons with populist inclinations,2 6 although a number of
2 1 James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Oallenge of Direct Democracy to State
Constitutional Jwisprudence, 11 HAsTiNcs CONST. L.Q. 43, 44 n.7 (1983). As of 1990, 26
states permitted voters to initiate legislation or demand referral of legislative enactments.
Thirty-six permitted statutory referenda. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALEL.J. 1503, 1509-10 (1990).
22 In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971), Justice Black stated that the
provisions for direct democracy "demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias,
discrimination, or prejudice." The Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate
District, has also stated that the right of initiative or referendum is "one of the most precious
rights of our democratic process." Mervyne v. Acker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1961).
23 Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557
P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976) (footnotes omitted).
24 Eule, supra note 21, at 1510.
25 REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 18.
26 In the United States, the effort to adopt the referendum process was led by members
of the Progressive movement generally between 1890 and American entry into World War
L The premises for the need for such a process were based on a faith in the unorganized,
free individual and a hostility to intermediary organizations that interfered between the
people and the government. Lobbyists and special interest groups are the contemporary
incarnations of these intermediary organizations. REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 27-28;
Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 507-08.
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its current proponents represent a more conservative philosophy.27 Its appeal is
less contingent upon a particular ideology than it is a disillusionment with the
representative governmental process. Thus, those who perceive elected officials
to be unduly influenced by competing "special interest" groups are susceptible
to utilizing this method of legislation and constitutional amendment.
2. Benefits
Advocates and scholars of direct democracy have advanced a number of
theories which suggest the benefits of referenda and initiatives. They include
the following:
(1) Ballot measures permit all issues to be addressed. It has been suggested
that politicians will often avoid controversial and divisive issues in order to
avoid voter hostility. The initiative permits such issues to be addressed when
the legislative and executive branches refuse to deal with them.28
(2) Direct democracy permits decisions to be brought close to the people.
Under this theory, ballot measures permit people to directly make decisions
about policy issues, rather than through others, and thus, the mystery of
government policymaking is clarified. This clarification of the empowerment of
the individual can be viewed as a legitmate end in itself.29
(3) Ballot measures allow public decisions to be arrived at publicly. This
notion is based upon the belief that intermediary organizations often make
decisions in private so that the public is unaware of what is being done to it.30
Proponents of this theory believe that democracies thrive best when decision-
2 7 See Eule, supra note 21, at 1507 (noting conservative politicians and think tanks
praising the virtues of direct democracy). Many modem measures attempt to limit civil
rights, personal lifestyle, and moral choices. Marc Slonim & James H. Lowe, Comment,
Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L. REv. 175, 180-82 (1979).
28 RFUENnuMS, supra note 1, at 29-30. On the other hand, referenda are less likely
to offer this benefit because they are created by legislative bodies. Referenda are, however,
somewhat useful in this arena because some legislative bodies, which would not directly
pass a tax increase or other controversial measure, are willing to give the electorate the
chance to vote on the issue because it removes the difficult decision from their hands.29 Id. at 30.
30 But see Sirico, supra note 1, at 670-71. Professor Sirico argues that the legislature
is required to deliberate in public and thus provide a more accessible record upon which to
find the basis for the legislation. Depending upon the type of judicial review required by a
law, a public record is important in determining whether the law has a rational basis. Ballot
measures lack this required public record. The proponents of the measure have a lighter
burden to explain their measure than does the legislature, and the voter has no burden at all
to publicly account for his vote.
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making is done in a completely open manner.31
(4) Ballot measures more accurately e~ress the popular will. This theory
argues that when the popular will is expressed through any type of
intermediary group, it is prone to distortion. The most common contemporary
incarnation of such intermediary organizations are the groups which lobby for
and against legislation with the executive and legislative branches of
government. Such a theory also rests upon the assumption that the popular will
is the sum of the society's individual wills. 32
(5) Direct democracy helps end citizen apathy and alienation. The essence
of this claim is that persons feel cynical about the ability of politicians to avoid
special interest manipulation, causing an apathy about the political process.
Through the referendum, persons are given direct control over the lawmaking
process, and thus feel empowered. 33
(6) Ballot measures serve the public interest. This claim is based upon the
notion that the will of the majority is an expression of the public interest.
Again, this theory expounds the view that intermediate organizations represent
special interests that are not in the best interest of the public community as a
whole.34
(7) Direct democracy helps citizens maximize their hwnan potential. This
theory posits that political participation enhances the full development of every
citizen's human potential. If there is any loss in the public good, it is
outweighed by the gain from the fulfillment of the individual's realization of his
full growth. 35
(8) Direct democracy has a positive educational impact. Some proponents
of ballot measures also note the educational value of the campaigns surrounding
31 REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 30-31.
3 2 This notion is an expression of the direct democracy philosophy of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau who wrote:
Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot be alienated; its
essence is the general will, and that will must speak for itself, or it does not exist; it is
either itself or not itself, there is no intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people,
therefore, are not and cannot be their representatives; they can only be their
commissioners, and as such are not qualified to conclude anything definitively. No act
of theirs can be a law, unless it has been ratified by the people in person; and without
that ratification nothing is a law.
Id. at 31 (citing 3 JEAN-JACQUEs RoussEAu, THE SOCLAL CONmACr 85 (Charles Frankel
trans., 1947)).
3 3 Id. at 31-32.
34 Id. at 32-33.
35 Id at 33.
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such measures. The publicity given to such issues can raise public awareness
and inform voters of the merits and dangers of various public policy issues.3 6
3. Dangers
On the other hand, many persons believe that referenda and initiatives also
raise a number of troubling problems. They include:
(1) Ballot measures weaken the power of elected authorities. This claim is
based upon the theory that increased usage of ballot measures will remove
issues out of the control of elected officials. Such removal decreases the types
of issues over which the officials have influence. Currently, one can observe
this phenomenon in the negative reaction to representative government
expressed by those who demonstrate disdain of the political machinations of the
legislative, and to a lesser extent, the executive branches of government. 37 This
disdain results in ballot measures that attempt to restrict the ability of elected
officials to pass legislation or to limit the number of terms they may serve.38
(2) Ordinary citizens are less able to make wise decisions on complex or
emotionally volatile issues. This theory espouses the idea that the problems
facing modem governments are often complex and deserve the type of lengthy,
considered deliberations best handled by persons considering the issue after
study and debate. One commentator has noted that ballot propositions are often
poorly drafted, complex, and polarizing in effect.39 Because of competing time
pressures, ordinary citizens are not able to devote the time and consideration
that the issues deserve.40 Further, the complexity and number of measures on a
36 Eugene C. Lee, Calibnia, in REFEENDUMS, supra note 1, at 87, 97 (citing
California proposition to legalize marijuana whose sponsors knew that it had little chance of
passage, but who believed that the campaign would provide important public education).
37 REFEENDUMS, supra note 1, at 34.
38 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Limited Political Terms in
Certain Elective Offices, 592 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991); Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120 (Nev.
1992).
39 Fischer, supra note 21, at 66. Professor Fischer notes:
Ballot propositions qualified by petition are not drafted in a way that inspires confidence
in their care for and attentiveness to the problems they address. Written in secret by
those who share a common view of societal problems, ballot propositions eschew
compromise and tend toward extremism with appalling firquency.
Id. (citation omitted).
40 REFERENDUMs, supra note 1, at 34. Some studies have shown that as many as 10 to
15% of voters cast ballots contrary to their policy preferences. Eule, supra note 21, at
1518.
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ballot, which also include a number of candidates for office, may simply
confuse voters. 41 This does not assume that voters are lazy or ignorant. Some
ballots are simply extremely long.42 Many persons will therefore choose not to
vote on some propositions. 43 In addition, referenda are often used to appeal to
the worst types of irrational fears. 44 Sensitive, complex political campaigns are
often reduced to simplistic moral judgments by the proponents. 45
(3) Ballot measures fail to measure the intensity of the belief of the voters.
This theory is based upon the notion that on some issues, certain persons have
a stronger interest in determining their outcome. Elected representatives must
sometimes be more sensitive to strongly held views by some of their
constituents, even when the constituency does not constitute a majority,
because the official must represent all of his constituents.46 This failure to
account for such intensity can increase the polarizing effect of a ballot measure
that is approved by a majority who lack strong feelings about the issue against
the will of a minority significantly impacted by it.
(4) Ballot measures force decisions rather than consensus. The
referendum/initiative process reduces public policy issues to yes or no
propositions. Critics of the plebiscite opine that some public policy measures
are best resolved through a consensus-building process where solutions are
worked out in a spirit of give and take. Forcing an either/or decision increases
political polarization and creates a mentality where the victory of one group
41 See Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State
Consitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1473, 1504-06 (1987); see also Robert Horvat, Comment, The Oregon Initiative
Process. A Oitical Appraisal, 65 OR. L. REv. 169, 180 n.63 (1986) (citing an Oregon
study that only a small percentage of Oregon voters read the handbook explaining the
measures and an even smaller percentage understood the substantive content of many of the
proposals).
42 Professor Eule relates that during the 1988 election, he received a 159 page
summary and analysis of the state ballot measures in California, a 64 page summary for the
Los Angeles City measures, and a separate pamphlet for the Los Angeles County measures.
Eule, supra note 21, at 1508-09.
43 Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lavmaking: Questioning the Desirability and
Consdiutonality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 CAL. L. REV. 735, 740 (1988) (citing 1982
study of elections in 18 states and the District of Columbia showing that a significant
percentage of voters who went to the polls did not vote on the ballot issue question).
44 Professor Derrick Bell has stated: "Appeals to prejudice, oversimplification of the
issues, and exploitation of legitimate concerns by promising simplistic solutions to complex
problems often characterize referendum and initiative campaigns." Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendun: Democracy's Banier to Racial Equality, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1978).
45 Slonim & Lowe, supra note 27, at 183.
4'6 REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 35.
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over the other becomes the goal. 47 In addition, it may distort the actual will of
the majority. 48 Even persons who are supportive of direct democracy have
noted this problem with some ballot measures. 49
(5) Ballot measures raise special dangers to minorities. Because this issue
is of critical significance to the groups affected by the propositions analyzed in
this Article, this concern will be discussed in detail below, but it is one that
most persons who have studied ballot measure laws have noted.50
(6) Ballot measures weaken representative government. Critics contend that
as referenda/initiatives increase, they will weaken the power of the
representative government. As the power of elected officials weakens, so will
the desire of some of the most qualified persons to seek elective office.51
Further, these measures can be seen as circumventing the republican form of
government established on both the federal and state levels.52 With the ballot
measure, the voter, unlike an elected official, is not subjected to any public
process when choosing to cast his vote. He is responsible to no one but himself
and is not subjected to the public scrutiny of the elected official. Thus, the
47 Id.
4 8 Eule, supra note 21, at 1520-22.
4 9 In the conclusion to their comparative study of referenda, Butler and Ranney note:
Referendums disturb politicians-and us-because they tend to force the decision
makers, the voters, to choose between only two alternatives: they must either approve
or reject the measure referred. Th'e is no opportunity for continuing discussion of
other alternatives, no way to search for the compromise that will draw the widest
acceptance. Referendums by their very nature set up confrontations rather than
encourage compromises. They divide the populace into victors and vanquished. They
force decisions often before the discussion process has had a chance to work itself out
fully. Surely this is a great deficiency.
REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 226.
50 See infra part IV.
51 REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 36-37.
5 2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence." Whatever this clause means, it would
appear that the United States Supreme Court has declined to consider it an issue for the
judiciary to enforce. See Fischer, supra note 21, at 61-62 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849) (refusing to intervene between two competing groups who claimed to be
the government of Rhode Island and calling the issue a political question which was best left
to the executive and legislative branches to resolve) and Pacific States Tel. and Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)). Professor Fischer does note that state courts have not been
as unwilling to consider Guarantee Clause issues. Id. at 63.
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disincentive to place personal interest ahead of public good is much weaker for
an individual in a voting booth than it is for an elected official whose particular
vote will be scrutinized by the media and the public alike.53
(7) Direct democracy fails to represent the true will of the people. Some
commentators have argued that referenda/initiatives may fail to truly reflect the
will of the public. 54 First, they only reflect the views of those who vote at a
particular election, which may not be representative, particularly with an
emotional measure that may disproportionately attract voters with strong
feelings about the proposal.5 5 Further, the notion that these measures truly
reflect the will of the people belies the amount of attention the voting public
gives to most measures.56 Many voters do not decide on the measure until the
eve of the election. 57 This should not be surprising since many of the measures
are complex or confusing. 58 Of course this argument can be raised about
almost any election. It may be more significant, however, when the election
denies one group of citizens the ability to seek laws that would prohibit
arbitrary discrimination against them.
53 James I. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript
to Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 881, 902 (1970); Slonim & Lowe, supra note
27, at 181.54 Eule, supra note 21, at 1513-22.
55 It has been noted that of the 2,003,375 registered voters in Colorado, only
1,597,166 went to the polls and 1,524,117 voted on Amendment Two. Of those who voted,
813,966 voted in favor of the amendment, which accounted for only 40% of registered
voters and an even smaller percentage of voting age citizens. Niblock, supra note 13, at 189
(citing NATALIE MEYER, STATE OF COLORADO, ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST 1992, at 142
(1993)).
56 The Montana Supreme Court noted this problem when it stated:
The majority of qualified electors are so much interested in managing their own
affairs that they have no time carefully to consider measures affecting the general
public. A great number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial knowledge of
proposed laws to be voted upon, which is derived from newspaper comments or
from conversation with their associates. We think the assertion may safely be
ventured that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or zealously oppose
the passage of a proposed law, initiated by petition, who have attentively studied
its contents and know how it will probably affect their private interests. The
greater number of voters do not possess this information.
Sawyer Stores, Inc., v. Mitchell, 62 P.2d 342, 348-49 (Mont. 1936) (quoting Westbrook v.
McDonald, 43 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Ark. 1931)). But see Horvat, supra note 41, at 172
(questioning the effect of language in petitions and ballots).
57 Lee, supra note 36, at 110-11.58 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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(8) Ballot propositions may be more difficult to repeal. Some states make it
more difficult to change a ballot proposition, once approved.59 Even without
legal restrictions, legislators will often feel a pragmatic reluctance to overturn a
matter approved by the electorate. 60
In addition to the preceding substantive dangers, there are a number of
practical concerns which arise with contemporary initiatives. Ballot measures
are sometimes tied to candidate campaigns, which may cause such measures to
succeed or fail based upon their tie to a candidate. 61 Whether tied to a
candidate or not, the ballot measure is also influenced by the turnout for other
candidates and measures on the same ballot. 62 Although not always
determinative, the amount of funding for a ballot campaign may also influence
the result.63 Furthermore, ballot measures increasingly involve petitions in
which the signatures are gathered by professional signature-gatherers, and the
campaigns are run by professional campaign organizations. The
professionalization of the campaigns is not necessarily bad, but it undercuts the
idealistic notion of the initiative as direct democracy in action, in which citizens
with a burning commitment to an issue are maximizing their ultimate potential
as humans by bringing the issue to the ballot.64 Rather than dramatically alter
the influence that special interest groups maintain over legislation, one
commentator has concluded from his study of the process in California, that:
What emerges from this review is that while a few groups outside the
main political stream occasionally try to employ the initiative process, the main
actors are those who regularly do battle in legislative corridors or in campaigns
for elective office. For these groups, the initiative is mainly another weapon-
or hurdle-in the contest for political power and influence. 65
59 See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. II, § 41 (forbidding the legislature from amending or
repealing a popular enactment within two years unless a two-thirds majority of each house
of the legislature approves).60 Slonim & Lowe, supra note 27, at 183.
61 Lee, supra note 36, at 99.
62 Id. at 108.
63 Id. at 103-04. It is difficult to estimate the impact of fundraising abilities of the
opposing groups in these campaigns. In a study of 25 ballot propositions in California
between 1968 and 1980, the amount spent on campaigns was not always determinative. The
study concluded that although one-sided spending was not effective when supporting a
proposition, it was almost invariably successful when it was used by the side in opposition.
Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 511.64 See Lee, supra note 36, at 101.
65 Id. at 99.
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B. Procedural Requirements for Initiatives and Referenda
Although most states have used constitutional referenda since their
formation, the other forms of direct democracy did not take hold until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 66 Over twenty states permit citizens to
create or amend statutes or constitutional provisions through the initiative
process. 67 All but Delaware require that constitutional amendments must
eventually be approved by referendum.68 Most states also allow local
governmental units to place initiative or referendum questions on the ballot.69
The states impose procedural requirements to attempt to ensure that the
provisions have at least minimal interest among the voters. Such provisions
sometimes require a certain percentage of voters to sign petitions and may
require that the signatures be distributed across the state.70 They also usually
impose signature verification requirements. 71 These requirements do not
prevent irregularities and may even encourage them if the requirements are
66 Austin Ranney, United States, in REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 67, 69.
67 The following state constitutions permit amendment or revision through the initiative
process: ARIZ. CoNsT. art. XXI, § 1; ARK. CoNsT. amend. VII; CAL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 8,
10, art. XVIII, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 5; ILL. CONST.
art. XV, § 3; ME. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18; MD. CoNsT. art. XVI, §§ 1-4; MASS.
CONST. amend. LXXXI, amend. XLVIII, pt. III, § 2, pt. IV, §§ 1-5; MCH. CoNsT. art.
XVI, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. fi, §§ 50, 51; MoNT. CoNsT. art. XV, § 9; NEB. CoNsT. art.
III, §§ 2, 4; NaV. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 2, 4; N.D. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-10; OHIo CONST.
art. If, §§ l(a), lo); OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 2, 3; OR. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2-4; S.D.
CONST. art. XXIII, §§ 1, 3.
68 Colantuono, supra note 41, at 1478.
69 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 8(b) (requiring five percent of voters in last
gubernatorial election for statutory initiatives and eight percent of voters in last
gubernatorial election for constitutional amendments); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18(2)
(requiring ten percent of voters in last gubernatorial election); MICH. CONST. art. XII § 2
(requiring ten percent of voters in last gubernatorial election); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 50
(requiring eight percent of voters in two-thirds of the congressional districts for
constitutional amendments, five percent of such voters for proposing laws); NEv. CONST.
art. 19, § 2(2) (requiring ten percent of voters in last general election in at least seventy-five
percent of the counties); OR. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2(b) (requiring six percent of vote in last
gubernatorial election for statute) and 2(c) (requiring eight percent of vote in last
gubernatorial election for constitutional amendment).
71 See, e.g., M. CoNsT. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18(2); MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; see also
Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding
Michigan requirements concerning the dating of petition forms and the manner in which
warnings to petition-signers were to be made).
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sufficiently high.72 Other states impose reading level requirements. 73 In some
states, however, the procedural hurdles are indeed minimal. 74
C. Textual Requirements
1. Single Subject
Some states also have textual requirements that attempt to guarantee clarity
and fairness in the voting process. One typical example is the requirement that
the initiative cover only a single subject.75 This requirement serves two
purposes: (1) it helps to prevent an initiative from being too complex for
understanding, and (2) it prevents "logrolling," a process by which an
unpopular measure is linked with a popular one with the hope that the
unpopular issue will be passed because voters want the popular one.76 This
principle is somewhat elusive as almost any measure can be broken into
subsections. The courts have attempted to characterize the standard in various
manners, including the "functional" test that attempts to determine if all of the
sections of a proposal are germane and functionally related.77 Some states also
differentiate between amending a constitution and revising it.78
2. Ballot Swmnary and itle
In addition, some states will require that the ballot have a title or summary
72 See Fountaine, supra note 43, at 746, for a description of forgery, deception, and
other illegal activities engaged in by signature-gatherers in California. See also Krivanek v.
Take Back Tampa Political Campaign, 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993), cet. deded, 114 S. Ct.
1538 (1994) (overturning a referendum that repealed Tampa's ordinance prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination because of petitions invalidated as a result of signatures obtained
from persons ineligible to vote).
73 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 250.039 (1991).
74 For example, until recently, the Colorado Constitution only required eight percent
for constitutional initiatives (five percent for statutory ones) of the number of total electors,
as opposed to persons who actually voted in a given election, without geographic
distribution requirements. CoLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 1 (amended 1980).
75 See OR. CONST. art. IV, § (2)(d); FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8(d).
76 See, e.g., Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984); Fine v. Firestone, 448
So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984).
77 See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978) (upholding Proposition 13 tax measure).
78 See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. XVII; McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); Holmes v. Appling, 392 P.2d 636 (Or. 1964).
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that explains the substance of the proposal in a manner that assists the electorate
in understanding the proposition upon which it is voting.79 A number of courts
have attempted to interpret what this requirement entails. 80 Due to the
complexity of some measures and the need to keep the summaries relatively
brief,81 this standard can also be daunting.82 The summaries are sometimes
prepared by the proponents of the measure,8 3 and sometimes by a state
official.84 In addition to providing adequate information, courts may also
require that the summary not omit material facts.8 5 The requirements of the
summary may be enforced at either the petition-gathering stage or when the
measure is placed upon the ballot.
D. The Benefits and Dangers Analysis of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures
The philosophical justifications for giving deference to plebiscites in this
substantive area is not only unwarranted by constitutional doctrine, but is
contrary to the philosophical justifications for direct democracy. Returning to
the eight benefits of unrestricted direct democracy listed in Part ML1(A)(2) of this
Article, some would argue that some of the benefits of this process are met by
the anti-gay measures. They permit the controversial issue of gay rights to be
faced. They allow the decision to be made directly by the people. The decisions
are reached after public discussions through the mass media and public
campaigns. The vote would be seen by some as a true expression of the
popular will. The emotion and intensity of the campaigns denote a lack of
apathy and alienation by at least some of the voters. For the victors of the
campaigns, it could be asserted that the public interest has been served. To the
79 See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. XII, § 2; ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.320 (1988); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (West Supp. 1994).80 See, e.g., Burgess v. Alaska Lieutenant Governor, 654 P.2d 273, 275-76 (Alaska
1982) (holding that summaries must be truthful and impartial); Grose v. Firestone, 422 So.
2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982) (holding that a summary must contain no hidden meanings and no
deceptive phrases, giving fair notice of the meaning and effect of the proposed amendment);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 171 N.E. 294 (Mass. 1930); Sawyer Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell,
62 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1936).
81 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 250.035(1) (1991).
82 See infra notes 158, 169-77, 187-92 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (West Supp. 1994).
84 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. H, § 10(d); IDAHO CODE § 34-1809 (1994); OR. REv.
STAT. § 250.065 (1990).
85 See, e.g., Smith v. American Airlines, 606 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1992) (striking a
proposed amendment because the summary failed to explain that the new taxation rate on
leaseholds of government-owned property would be based on the real property method and
thus could be increased fifteen-fold).
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extent that ballot campaigns involve persons not otherwise involved in the
political process, their potential as citizens may have been maximized. Finally,
some educational impact may be accomplished through the campaigns.
On the other hand, a closer evaluation of these benefits reveals that the
normal advantages of ballot propositions are considerably weaker with the anti-
gay measures. The issue-avoidance consideration is not present with these
measures because over one hundred jurisdictions have approved sexual
orientation discrimination and a number of other jurisdictions have considered
it.8 6 These plebiscites are trying to remove the issue from the agenda, rather
than add to it. The misinformation supplied by the proponents of these
measures undercuts much of the benefit to be gained from public discussion of
gay, lesbian, and bisexual equality rights. Whether this issue truly expresses
the public will is open to debate. Certainly, the issue of whether the public
interest is being served by these measures is hotly contested by many civil
rights activists. Finally, because of the misrepresentation noted, some would
contend that the public has been miseducated by the distortions provided by the
proponents of these measures.87
Furthermore, the dangers listed in Part Ill(A)(3) seem to be even more
strongly posed by these initiatives and referenda. These measures directly
weaken the power of elected authorities, particularly those measures that would
permanently prevent elected officials from passing legislation in the future
concerning the issue. This use of the ballot proposition does more than provide
an alternative to the republican legislative process, it attempts to permanently
supplant it in some areas of the law. Further, these measures demonstrate the
problems of permitting voters to contemplate complex, emotionally charged
issues. The manipulation of legal concepts and the misrepresentation of social
science data has marred the campaigns. As the polling in Colorado
demonstrated, the vote on these measures often turns upon the vote of persons
without strong feelings about them.88 The anti-gay measures strongly represent
the problems of polarization. Rather than address compromise and consensus,
the voters are forced to make unnecessarily restricted choices. Many gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals would agree that quotas, preferences, and special
statutes are not necessary or even sought in most circumstances, but these
plebiscites prevent any ability to construct a compromise on the issue. Voters
who feel hesitant about adding more groups to the civil rights statutes in Idaho
are forced to also vote for the draconian restrictions on teachers and public
8 6 Note, Comiidonal!DLrUs on AnGay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARv. L. REy. 1905,
1905 (1993).
8 7 AMRIC CryL LBaRTans UNION, ACLU BRIEFNG BOOK 38-40 (1993)
[hereinafter ACLU].88 Id. at 61.
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libraries if they are to support the measure.89 These measures clearly weaken
representative government. Passage would prevent a group that could
demonstrate unfair discrimination from obtaining relief from its elected
officials. The lack of public accountability also was evident in the Colorado
election in which the polls repeatedly showed the measure going down to
defeat, but in the secrecy of the voting booth, the voters acted differently. 90
Finally, the distortions and fear-mongering raise a question as to whether the
true will of the people is being captured through these elections. 91 These
measures present a clear and present danger to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, as
well as sound the clarion call to other groups discriminated against in this
society.
In addition to the factual misstatements noted with Colorado's Amendment
Two, the proponents were advised to use the terms minority status, quota
preferences, and protected status all before the term "discrimination," which
was the last word in the descriptive portion of the amendment. 92 The use of
emotionally laden terms as an attempt to generate negative emotions for the
proposal and to place them at the front of it were a calculated attempt to
influence voters. This attempt to campaign within the framework of the
initiative itself is troubling because it misleads the voters. Not only were the
other terms geared to arouse the emotions of the voter, they were also arguably
irrelevant, as the antidiscrimination laws at which this measure was aimed do
not require the notions described.
Special concerns may also be warranted when an initiative is proposed or
when the matter is constitutional in nature. As has been noted, procedures that
permit amendments to be easily passed may undercut the deliberation and
stability one seeks in constitutional law. 93 Proponents of this theory of
constitutional law believe that constitutions should be confined to questions
concerning the authorization of, procedural aspects of, and limits on
governmental power.94 Those states that allow the constitution to be easily
amended often find that their constitutions are, in fact, amended frequently. 95
89 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
90 The polls indicated that, two days prior to the election, voters disapproved of
Amendment Two by 54% to 40%. The ultimate approval by 53% to 47% thus showed a
twenty-point difference. Similar polling results have occurred in elections involving African-
American political candidates. ACLU, supra note 87, at 65-66; see also Niblock, supra
note 13, at 154 n.5.
91 See generally ACLU, supra note 87.
92 Id. at 39-40.
93 See Colantuono, supra note 41, at 1509.
94 REFERENDUMS, supra note 1, at 76.
95 See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620
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IV. THE OPPRESSIVE TENDENCIES OF BALLOT INITIATIVES
A. The History of Ballot Initiatives Versus Racial Minorities
In spite of the idealistic statements by some courts and proponents of
legislative measures obtained through the ballot box, the reality of the ballot
measure is that it is sometimes used to attack minority groups or to promote an
extreme position on an emotional issue.96 Because referenda or initiatives are
decided by majority vote, the danger exists that minority groups will have their
interests overridden and ignored. 97 One commentator has remarked that "[a]n
untrammeled majority is indeed a dangerous thing .... Mhe majority can
tyrannize the minority."98 Ballot measures directed toward various minorities
are frequently used in contemporary society. 99
Other minority groups in this country have faced ballot measures similar to
So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1993), in which Justice McDonald, in a concurring opinion, lamented both
the frequency of and the insertion of statutory matter into constitutional amendments:
Recognizing the sovereignty of the people, I still feel compelled to express my view that
the permanency and supremacy of state constitutional jurisprudence is jeopardized by
the recent proliferation of constitutional amendments.
... However, the legislative power of the state is vested in the Legislature, art.
M, § 1, and on matters that are statutory in nature, a concerted effort should be made to
have the Legislature address the subject. The technical requirements, such as the single-
subject rule and the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1991), appear
insufficient to prevent abuse of the amendment process.
Id. at 1000 (McDonald, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). Justice McDonald noted that
between 1968 and 1984, Florida's constitution was amended 41 times, at a rate of 2.4 per
year. Since 1980, 37 of 44 amendments were adopted, including 4 of the 6 proposed by
initiative. d. at 1000 n.2 (citing Colantuono, supra note 41, at 1509 n.232).
96 See supra notes 44, 91-92 and accompanying text. See generally Fisher, supra note
21.
97 R mUNuMS, supra note 1, at 36.
98 boHNH. ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 8 (1980).
99 In November 1988, voters approved initiatives declaring English as the official
language in Arizona, Colorado, and Florida; indigent women were denied funding for
abortions in Arkansas, Colorado, and Michigan; and California authorized involuntary
AIDS testing for sex crime suspects and assailants of police and emergency workers. Eule,
supra note 21, at 1551. In California, however, voters rejected an initiative seeking to
restrict the rights of gay and lesbian public school teachers, and in 1986 they defeated an
attempt to empower health authorities to quarantine persons with AIDS. Id. at 1586.
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those being used against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals today. Attempts to
thwart racial discrimination laws were common during the early years of the
Civil Rights Movement. l 0 In 1978, Professor Derrick Bel noted: "[Tihe
experience of blacks with the referendum has proved ironically that the more
direct democracy becomes, the more threatening it is." 101 Professor Bel
additionally noted that the threat of referenda was serious for other discrete
minorities in addition to racial groups. 10 He argued that the public nature of
the legislative process that can transform a conservative politician into a
moderate one is diluted in the privacy of the voting booth. 1°3 Elected
representatives have a duty to govern on behalf of all of their constituents,
including minority constituents. 104 The United States Supreme Court has
previously acknowledged this danger with respect to racial minorities and
struck measures which erected impermissible hurdles for members of such
groups.105
Using ballot measures against minorities is especially troubling because the
electorate tends to differ from the total adult population. Lower socioeconomic
groups, minorities, the indigent, and the uneducated tend to vote in smaller
relative numbers than the rest of the population.10 6 In order to subvert the
prejudicial impact of these measures, one commentator has assumed that the
courts must provide a protective role in this area. 107 Several others who have
100 Even before this century, plebiscites were brought in Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, and
Oregon that effectively prevented free blacks from settling in their states and territories.
Sirico, supra note 1, at 641 n.33.
101 Bell, supra note 44, at 1.
102 Id. at2.
103 AL at 14. This public chastening effect is further borne out by the polls in Colorado
in which likely voters repeatedly indicated their opposition to Amendment Two, but voted
the opposite. See sipra note 90.
104 Slonim & Lowe, supra note 27, at 188.
105 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (overturning a
statewide initiative to repeal a busing plan adopted by the Seattle school district to
ameliorate racial segregation); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (overturning a city
charter amendment that repealed existing antidiscrimination ordinances and requiring future
voter approval of any city ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral
discrimination in housing); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking a facially
neutral amendment to the California Constitution, which would have prevented the state
from interfering with a person's absolute right to sell or rent property to whomever he
wanted).106 R R uMs, supra note 1, at 108-09.
107 Professor Lee notes in his summation of referendum/initiative concerns:
The initiative will continue to permit "flashes of prejudice and emotion to sweep
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studied voter initiatives also have stated that some type of safety mechanism is
necessary to protect minority interests. 108
B. The Use of Ballot Measures Against Lesbians, Bisetwas, and Gay
Men
The current spate of anti-gay initiatives are only the second wave of such
measures. The first wave began with the campaign of evangelist singer Anita
Bryant who led a repeal of a sexual orientation antidiscrimination ordinance in
Dade County, Florida. 109 In addition to the repeal of civil rights protections,
other anti-gay legislation was also spawned from these campaigns.' 0 Although
continued lobbying aganst lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals continued
throughout the 1980s, the second wave arguably received its current impetus
with a 1988 Oregon initiative to overturn an executive order forbidding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the executive branch of state
government.11 This second wave is being led by conservative religious
organizations that are conducting sophisticated campaigns using sensationalistic
videos and quoting allegedly scientific data, relying heavily upon a person
expelled from professional associations for ethical violations.112 As has been
legislation onto or off the statute books," but the increased role of the courts in ruling
on the constitutionality of such measures would appear to provide a protection against
the dangers of such actions with respect to questions of civil liberties and civil rights.
Lee, supra note 36, at 118 (footnote omitted).
10 8 Eule, supra note 21, at 1554 (citing numerous scholars who have studied the direct
democracy process).
109 The repeal of the Dade County ordinance sparked similar repeals in St. Paul,
Minnesota, Wichita, Kansas, and Eugene, Oregon. Bell, supra note 44, at 18 & n.71; see
also St. Paul Citizens for Human Rights v. City Council, 289 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. 1979).
110 Shortly following the campaign in Dade County, the Florida legislature amended
its adoption statute to prohibit homosexuals from adopting children. This statutory section,
which was recently upheld in a unanimous en banc decision by the Second District Court of
Appeal of Florida, is currently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, which has accepted
jurisdiction. Cox v. Health and Rehabilitative Services, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993), review granted, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1994).
111 This measure was overturned in Merrick v. Board of Higher Educ., 841 P.2d 646
(Or. App. 1992). The court held that the initiative violated the free expression clause of the
Oregon Constitution.
112 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 368-69; Note, supra note 86, at 1909. Both
commentators discuss the use of a video tape currently being used in campaigns around the
country, entitled The Gay Agenda, which splices together the most outrageous footage from
gay pride parades. The latter also quotes from some Colorado literature which argues that
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noted above, proponents of these measures have at least ten states targeted for
the 1994 general election. 13
V. LEGAL PROBLEMS wITH CURRENT ANTI-GAY INTiATrVEs
A. The ConstituionalArgwments
This section will identify some of the most common arguments utilized on
behalf of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in areas of the law concerning
discrimination. It will not address all of the possible constitutional arguments,
such as the right to privacy, but will instead address those which seem most
relevant and likely to be successful with ballot propositions. A number of other
commentators have addressed these issues more exhaustively, and therefore the
arguments will be discussed only briefly here. 1 4 Further, because state
constitutions may be amended through an initiative or referendum, state
constitutional arguments will not be separately addressed." 15
1. First Amendment Arguments
Some have argued that anti-gay ballot measures should fall under
traditional First Amendment claims of free speech and associational liberty.116
It has also been argued that the measures should fail because they interfere with
the right to petition the government for grievances.'1 7 Perhaps the most
gays "incorporate children into their sexual practices" and engage in sexual behaviors
which include ingesting feces and urine. The scientist most commonly relied upon in these
campaigns, Paul Cameron, has been dropped from both the American Psychological
Association and American Sociological Association for misrepresenting data. David Colker,
Statist'cs in "Gay Agenda" Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at 16A.
113 See supra note 2.
114 See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 21, at 66-69 (discussing due process and vagueness
problems); William M. Hohengarten, Sane-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103
YALE L.. 1495 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientat'on and the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161
(1988); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Ofientation. Homosexuality as a Suspect
Cassification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
115 If, for example, the proposed amendment did not explain the impact that the
measure would have on the state constitution, state constitutional arguments would be
relevant for ballot summary and title purposes. These issues will be discussed below. See
infra notes 159-61, 167-75, 179-90 and accompanying text.
116 Niblock, supra note 13, at 156; Note, supra note 86, at 1919-22.
117 See Idaho Att'y. Gen. Op. No. 93-11, at 26 n.5 (Nov. 3, 1993) (citing Citizens for
Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 655 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App.
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persuasive argument, however, is raised by Professor David A.J. Richards,
who argues that these initiatives and referenda violate the liberty of conscience
protected by the First Amendment.118 Professor Richards expresses this
violation as a "constitutionally forbidden sectarian religious intolerance
[through public law] against fundamental rights of conscience, speech, and
association of lesbian and gay persons.... ."119 Pointing out the religious-based
intolerance of the proponents of these amendments, the irrationality of many of
their assertions, and the history of recognizing the right of conscience to
include such even when it is not based upon theistic forms, Professor Richards
compellingly asserts that these measures promote constitutionally invidious
religious intolerance. 120 It is his assertion, which this author supports, that this
theory underlies the other constitutional arguments presented. 121
2. Republicanism
Some commentators have asserted that direct democracy poses a threat to
this country's republican form of government. 122 As noted elsewhere, the
United States Supreme Court has refused to apply the Guarantee Clause 123 on
the theory that it raises nonjusticiable political questions. 124 Nevertheless, the
state courts are not foreclosed from doing so. In fact, former Oregon Supreme
Court Justice Hans Linde argues that courts should disapprove of the anti-gay
ballot propositions precisely because they violate the principles of
republicanism ensured by this constitutional provision. 125 Justice Linde
1991), review denied, No. $0-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1251 (Cal. Mar. 12, 1992).
118 David A.Y Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An
Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIo
ST. L.J 491 (1994).119 Id. at 493.
120 Id. pasim.
121 Id. at 493.
122 Slonin & Lowe, supra note 27, at 192-94. Professor Seeley notes this concern
when he states: "A fear of direct democracy has often been characterized as the moving
force of the Constitutional Convention, and the entire idea of republican or representative
government was a product of that apprehension; one need only examine the convention
debates for myriad references contrasting democracy with republicanism." Seeley, supra
note 53, at 905.
123 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government.... ."); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-
10 (1962).
124 See Pacific States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (refusing to
overturn a tax measure enacted by initiative).
125 Hans A. Linde, When Iniiative Lawnaking Is Not 'Republican Government. The
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proposes a five-part test to eliminate ballot measures that arouse collective
passions126 in a manner that should not be permitted through the ballot measure
process.127 A number of the delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention
spoke against direct democracy, including James Madison as one of the
strongest critics. Madison spoke repeatedly about these dangers throughout The
Federalist.1 28 Noting the dangers of the majority oppressing a minority, he
stated, "[i]t is much more to be dreaded that the few will be unnecessarily
sacrificed to the many." 129 A representative government was selected over a
direct democracy, in part, to ensure proper respect for the rights of the
minority. 130 Professor Seeley has argued that language in Baker v. Car 13 1 and
C W'pgn Against Homosemuality, 72 OR. L. Rnv. 19 (1993).
126 Linde categorizes collective passions as those feelings which undercut collective
action through the appeal to groups by national, racial, ethnic, or tribal loyalties and
inherited hatreds, or by a shared sense of religious truth or moral outrage. He quotes former
Oregon Attorney General Dave Frohnmayer, who criticized "the growth of a politics based
upon narrow concerns, rooted in the exploitation of divisions of class, cash, gender, region,
ethnicity, morality and ideology-a give-no-quarter and take-no-prisoners activism that
demands satisfaction and accepts no compromise." Id. at 32.
127 Linde posits the following types of measures which are impermissible:
1. Initiatives that refer to any group of individuals in pejorative or stigmatizing
terms or, conversely, in terms that exalt one group over other members of the
community.
2. Initiatives that avoid emotional, ideological, or sectarian labels but are by their
terms directed against identifiable racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious, or other
social groups.
3. Initiatives that do not name any targeted group but that are proposed in a
historical and political context in which the responsible state officials and judges
have no doubt that the initiative asks voters to choose sides for and against such an
identifiable group and that it is so understood by the public.
4. Initiatives which appeal to majority emotions to impose values that offend the
conscience of other groups in the community without being directed against those
groups.
5. Initiatives to place affirmative legislation into the constitution itself, where the
measure neither can be amended by the legislature nor tested by judges to stay
within limits imposed by the state's constitution.
Rd at 41-43.
128 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
129 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 JEFFRSON
PAPERs 2 (J. Boyd ed., 1945) (quoted in Slonim & Lowe, supra note 27, at 185).
130 Slonim & Lowe, supra note 27, at 188.
131 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Reynolds v. Sins 132 leaves an opening to argue that referenda used against
minority groups should be considered by the courts pursuant to a republican
governmental analysis, and he asserts that it is the Guarantee Clause that is
most applicable to these ballot measures that seek to restrict the rights of
minority groups. 133
An argument about plebiscites in general similar to the one above asserts
that ballot measures must be allowed, but they must not be permitted to
displace the primacy of the representative legislature required by the Guarantee
Clause. 134 Under this analysis, the ballot measure is a check upon the other
branches of government. The initiative and referendum serve as an ancillary
lawmaking procedure, but not one that displaces the legislative body it is
designed to check.' 35 The dilemma is how to keep the ballot measure in this
ancillary role.
3. Equal Protection Analysis
Some courts have recently recognized that anti-gay ballot measures violate
a right of political participation under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.136 These cases rely upon the decisions in Reitnan v.
Mulkey137 and Hunter v. Erickson.138 Whether these cases should be extended
to gays and lesbians depends in part upon how one interprets them. Because the
Court refused to extend the reasoning in these cases to indigent persons in
132 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
133 Professor Seeley states:
A system that subjects pro-minority group legislation already passed by
representative government to approval by absolute majority vote is similarly an obvious
denial of a republican form of government. It is not representative at all, and it subjects
the minority to exactly the kind of capriciousness that the guarantee clause was intended
to prevent.
... The implication [from Reynolds] is that where the issue is not political, and
where there is no clear absence of a manageable standard, guarantee clause claims may
be treated by the courts.
Seeley, supra note 53, at 909-10 (citations omitted).
13 4 Sirico, supra note 1, at 650-77.
13 5 Id. at 654-55.
136 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-93-773, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11444 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 1994); Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo.), ce'. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
137 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
138 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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James v. Valdierra,139 some would argue that the earlier cases were decided
based upon racial discrimination. In James, the Court refused to overturn a
voter initiative that required special local referenda to approve low-income
public housing projects. Others would argue that the case stands for the
proposition that indigent persons do not constitute an identifiable group that the
Court chooses to recognize. 140 In Gordon v. Lance,141 the Court again
mentioned the concept of protecting identifiable groups when it upheld a voting
plan in West Virginia that required a three-fifths vote to pass bond issues,
noting that Hunter was not applicable because the Court could not identify any
discernible group of persons who favored bond indebtedness over other types
of financing. 142 Justice Stevens has attempted to provide guidelines for
identifiable groups in Karcher v. Daggett,143 by noting that they may include
those "politically salient groups" 144 whose "common interests are strong
enough to be manifested in political action." 145 The Court has also indicated
that a political group could be protected by the Equal Protection Clause if it
were unfairly disadvantaged in the political process. 146
Some commentators have argued that lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are
entitled to suspect class protection.' 47 To date, this approach, for the most part,
has been unsuccessful in the courts. 148 This lack of success should not be
surprising because of the tests that courts have used to determine if a group
deserves suspect class status. As Professor Richards has argued, at least two of
the tests defy rational analysis, even when applied to groups recognized as
139 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
140 See LAURENCE H. TRINE, AMERCAN CONSTIUrIONAL LAW § 16-58, at 1666-67
(2d ed. 1988).
141 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
142 Id. at5.
143 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (Stevens, I., concurring).
144 Id. at 754.
145 Id. at 750 (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 88 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
146 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (rejecting a claim that a redistricting
scheme discriminated against democrats because there was insufficient proof of
discriminatory effect).
147 Niblock, supra note 13, at 167-71.
14 8 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), ceit. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Watkins
v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that homosexuals constitute
a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
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suspect classes. 149 The test of political powerlessness not only defies
measurement, it implies that a group could lose suspect class status once this
powerlessness is overcome.150 Further, Professor Richards and Professor Janet
Halley both argue that the immutability argument is one that lesbians, gays,
and bisexuals should avoid. 151 Although recent scientific evidence supports the
theory that sexual orientation is not chosen, 152 there remains dispute over this
issue. 153 If this argument is ultimately to succeed, the underlying justifications
for suspect class status must be reconceptualized. 154
There is also an argument asserted by some legal commentators that
149 See Richards, supra note 118, at 499-508.
150 Id. at 500-_1.
151 Professor Richards believes this argument "falsely and malignantly reduces to
biological terms what is essentially a principled argument for the just ethical emancipation
of the moral powers of conscience of lesbian and gay persons in terms that subvert its
emancipatory potential." Id. at 507; Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Qitique ofthe Argument from Imtability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994).
152 Halley, supra note 151, at 531-45.
153 Id. at 507-28; Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
StoIytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46
U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 540 n.139 (1992). Professor Daniel Ortiz discusses the current
debate among lesbian and gay historians and scholars concerning the contemporary lesbian
and gay subculture. At the risk of oversimplifying this debate, it is roughly a disagreement
between essentialists, who believe persons with a lesbian or gay identity have always
existed, although their identity has been suppressed by societal forces, and constructivists,
who argue that this identity is a relevantly recent phenomenon, which is a result of historical
and cultural forces that coerce people to label sexual feelings and behaviors so that a
separate subculture is developed. Daniel Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and
Constructivismn and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REy. 1833 (1993).
154 Professor Richards argues for such classification based upon First Amendment
principles for lesbians and gay men. The classification would include a group who is
subjected to a "rights-denying culture of irrational political prejudice," a prejudice that
"assigns intrinsically unreasonable weight to and burdens on identifications central to moral
personality." Richards, supra note 118, at 503. He sets out three factors in his suspect class
analysis for lesbians and gay men:
(1) a history and culture of unjust moral subjugation of homosexuals, (2) the
political legitimation of such subjugation by the exclusion of homosexuals from
the constitutional community of equal rights in the unreasonable way that gives
rise to intolerance and the irrational political prejudice of homophobia, and (3) the
sectarian religious expression of such prejudice against the conscientious claims of
lesbian and gay persons to justice in public and private life.
I at 509.
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is simply a form of gender
discrimination. 155 This analysis posits that discrimination occurs because of the
gender of one's sexual partner. Professor Marc Fajer draws upon the
miscegenation cases to support his argument that current constitutional law
should suffice to overturn measures which discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. 156 Professor Sylvia Law has also gathered an impressive array of
historical and sociological data to support her argument that sexual orientation
discrimination is grounded in gender discrimination.1 57
B. Procedural Objections to Cwrrent Anti-Gay Proposals
1. Overtly Hostile Amendments
Initiatives such as those rejected in Oregon and proposed in Washington
and Nevada raise numerous legal problems. The restrictions on the teaching
about homosexuality or allowing children access to books that provide
scientific explanations in libraries about homosexuality raise serious First
Amendment concerns. 158 In addition, they raise technical problems of some
severity. First, they clearly cover a number of subjects and should be rejected
on single subject grounds. A voter could be opposed to the restrictions on
libraries and schools, but vote for the measure because of support for the
restriction on civil rights protections of the targeted groups. Such a problem is
a classic example of logrolling.159
Even more serious is the failure of the measures to correctly explain their
purpose. Although it is unknown what, if any, summary will accompany some
of these measures on the ballot, the language of the proposals themselves
confuse and confound a number of subjects, misleading the voters in the
process. First, the reference to "minority status" is a legally meaningless
155 Fajer, supra note 153; Sylvia Law, Homosexuaity and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Ray. 187.
156 Fajer, supra note 153, at 634-38.
157 Law, supra note 155, at 188-206.
158 Board of Union Free Sch. Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (holding
public libraries must not remove books to suppress ideas); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (holding state must show compelling interest to justify discriminatory exclusion
from public forum); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 599
(1966) (upholding academic freedom).
159 Although reversed by an appellate court, a trial court in Oregon held that a
proposed measure violated Oregon's single subject requirement. Lowe v. Keisling, No.
93C-11972 (Marion County Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 1994), rev'd, No. CA-A84110, 1994 Ore.
App. LEXIS 1345 (Or. Dist. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994).
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categorization as recognized by the Idaho Attorney General. 160 Appealing to
the prejudices of those opposed to the advancement of persons who have
characteristics that cause them to be unfairly discriminated against, the label
"minority status" ignores the legal reality that antidiscrimination laws protect
all persons against wrongful discrimination. The civil rights statutes obviously
do not protect only women or persons of color, but any person discriminated
against because of his race or gender. However, the misleading attempt to
portray these measures as "special rights" meant to promote "minority groups"
is the central thrust of these measures. 161 The constitutional analysis applied to
the targeted measures covered in the next section is also applicable to these
proposals. 162
2. Targeted Groups Measures
As noted above, the constitutional problems of these measures have been
recognized by three courts pursuant to an Equal Protection analysis. The
Colorado Supreme Court has preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of
Amendment Two. 163 On November 16, 1993, the voters of Cincinnati passed a
similar measure which sought to limit protections for persons on the basis of
sexual orientation, conduct, or relationships. 164 A federal district court has also
160 ACLU v. Echohawk, 857 P.2d 626, 629 (Idaho 1993).
161 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 1I, § 30b (Colorado's Amendment Two); see supra
notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
162 See infra part V.B.2.
163 Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
164 Issue Three proposed:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS. The City of
Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, enforce or
administer any ordinance, regulon, rule or policy which provides that homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or
otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected
status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the City
Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be
null and void and of no force or effect.
CHARTER OF THE CrrY oF CINCINNATI art. XII. See infra Appendix I for a reproduction of
Issue Three. See also Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-
93-773, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11444, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 1994).
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entered a permanent injunction against this measure. 165 The City Council of
Riverside, California refused to place a proposed ordinance prohibiting
antidiscrimination protection for persons with AIDS and homosexuals on the
ballot. A California appellate court upheld this refusal in Citizens for
Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court,166 finding that the measure lacked a
rational basis. Although the court discussed the deference to be given the
initiative process, it also recognized that such deference was not to be
determinative. 167 The court was particularly critical of the notice accompanying
the petition, which indicated that recognizing the rights of gays and lesbians
would end in child molestation, prostitution, and child pornography.
Unfortunately, the attempts to use procedural protections against these
measures have met with mixed success. The technical problems with the
overtly hostile proposals are also present with those that attempt to target
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. They also refer to "minority status" and
"special rights." They are perhaps more palatable politically, but not legally.
In a case dealing with the description given to a petition during the
signature-gathering stage, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a municipal
referendum petition, which attempted to repeal the sexual orientation clause of
its public employer and municipal contractor law, had a misleading title:
"Referendum Petition to Repeal A 'Special Homosexual Ordinance.'" 168 The
court held that the referendum petition, by referring to the law as a special
ordinance, clearly mischaracterized the ordinance in a biased and partisan
way.169 As noted by the court, the mischaracterization of the proposition brings
165 Equalily Found. of Greater Cncinnati, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11444, at *1.
166 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. S0-24940, 1992 Cal.
LEXIS 1251 (Cal. Mar. 12, 1992).
167 The court stated:
Invalidity, like pregnancy admits of no half-measures. If an ordinance proposed by
initiative is invalid, routine deference to the process will often require the charade of a
pointless election.... But if the court is convinced, at any time, that a measure is
fatally flawed, it should not matter whether the decision is easy or dificult, simple or
complicated. Certainly it would be unconscionable for this court, at this time, to rule in
favor of petitioner on the basis that the issue is close-only to be faced with a post-
election challenge should the measure pass.
L at 652-53.16 8 Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1993).
169 I. at 1218. Of additional significance in this case is the fact that the Alaska
Supreme Court required this impartiality even though the municipal charter for Anchorage
merely required that the petition must describe the ordinance or resolution sought. The
dissent in the case found this construction troubling. In addition, the dissent faulted the
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about general opposition to it, causes the signature requirement to be too
readily overcome and thus thwarts the intended screening function of that
requirement. 170
Comparing the Alaska decision with the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling on
the titles of Idaho's anti-gay initiative demonstrates the difficulty in trying to
find a guiding principle in such cases. 171 In the latter case the ACLU pointed
out that the titles172 failed to define the terms "homosexual behavior" and
"minority status," the latter of which the Idaho Attorney General had certified
was not a status upon which any special benefits were conferred. 173 In
addition, the restriction on same-sex marriages did not indicate whether it
modified domestic partnerships. 174 The court unfortunately glossed over these
definitional shortcomings by essentially refusing to discuss them. 175 These two
cases exemplify the problem of trying to find a consistent application of the
principle of mischaracterizing titles and labels.176 Whereas one court finds the
term "special" to mislead, another permits ambiguous terms to go undefined
and permits the usage of one term without legal meaning to remain in a
measure which implies, by its context, that it does have a particular legal
significance.
There is also inconsistency in the rulings concerning state officials who are
empowered to assist in the ballot measure process. The attempt of a state
official to fulfill his duties in Maine resulted in a successful challenge under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.177 In this case, the Secretary of State for Maine refused to
release petitions to citizens seeking an initiative to require the legislature to
receive voter approval for any legislation providing antidiscrimination
legislation for homosexuals. The refusal was based upon his belief that the
initiative was unconstitutional. Not only did the court find his action improper,
majority for failing to distinguish between the description required for a summary for the
ballot as opposed to the petition itself and for not lowering the standard for a description of
an initiative as opposed to a referendum. Id. at 1221-25 (Moore, CJ., dissenting).
170 Id. at 1219-20.
171 ACLU v. Echohawk, 857 P.2d 626 (Idaho 1993).
17 2 What other states call a summary, Idaho designates as a long title.
17 3 ACLU, 857 P.2d at 629.
1741d
.
175 For a discussion of the ambiguity of the meaning of the terms "homosexual" and
"homosexual behavior," see Fajer, supra note 153, at 533-44, and Rhonda R. Rivera, Our
Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Honosexual Persons in the United States, 30
HASTiS LJ. 799 (1979).
17 6 See also Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023 (Or. 1993); deParrie v. Keisling, 862
P.2d 464 (Or. 1993). In deParrie, the Oregon Supreme Court struggled to develop
acceptable title and summary to a long and complex anti-gay ballot initiative.
177 See Wyman v. Secretary of State, 625 A.2d 307 (Me. 1993).
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but also it held that he had violated the First Amendment rights of the
petitioners. The decision in this case could be seen as strildng down an
improper exercise of executive authority, because the Secretary made a decision
more appropriate for the judiciary, but the court's refusal to seriously consider
the constitutional issues is troubling. Compare this decision to CiizQens for
Responsible Behavior,178 in which the court upheld the city council's refusal to
submit a ballot proposition to the electorate.
3. Stealth Measures
The technical problems with stealth initiatives were addressed by the
Florida Supreme Court in In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-
Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination.7 9 The court rejected proponents'
attempt to characterize the proposal as simply being about "discrimination." 180
The court noted that the amendment encroached upon municipal home rule
powers, 81 the rulemaking authority of executive agencies and the judiciary,' 82
Florida's equal protection clause,' 8 3 and the portion of the Florida Constitution
which deals with employee collective bargaining rights.' 84 The court also noted
that the enumeration of ten classes of people who would be protected by the
proposal actually encompassed ten questions but presented them as one.18 5
The court also disapproved of the ballot summary prepared by the
proponents. The court noted that the summary and text of the amendment
omitted mention of the "myriad of laws, rules, and regulations that may be
affected by the repeal of 'all laws inconsistent with this amendment.'' 1 6 In
addition, the court disapproved of the amendment's failure to explain that the
proposal restricted the power of governmental entities by preventing them from
adopting laws in the future to protect groups from discrimination.' 8 7 Although
the court did not expound on the myriad of laws threatened by this amendment,
the opponents of the amendment explained the effect in their brief. They argued
178 Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. SO-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1251 (Cal.
Mar. 12, 1992).
179 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
180 Id. at 1020.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2).
184 Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6).
185 1d
186 Id. at 1021.
187 Id.
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that the failure to define "discrimination," "right," "privilege," "protection,"
"characteristic," "trait," "status," or "condition" would possibly threaten
dozens of statutes which provided any kind of benefit or right based upon any
characteristic, trait, status, or condition. 188 Thus, the opponents suggested that
statutes that provided benefits to veterans, homestead property tax exemptions
for residents, and tuition preferences for state residents attending state
universities were subject to repeal. 189
The court did not address another argument raised by the opponents: that
the measure and its summary were affirmatively misleading because they failed
to inform the voters of the measure's central purpose-to restrict the rights of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. 190 This is particularly troubling since neither
the amendment nor its summary ever mentions sexual orientation or uses the
terms gay, lesbian or bisexual. 191 It is interesting to note that the decision of
the court also fails to mention any of these terms. The proponents of measures
in this category should be forced to tell the voter what the central purpose of a
188 Brief for Florida Public Interest Law Section, Florida AIDS Legal Defense &
Education Fund, Florida Association of Women Lawyers, Florida Legal Services, Inc.,
Floridians Respect Everyone's Equality, Floridians United Against Discrimination, Miami
Area Legal Services Union, National Lesbian & Gay Lawyers Association, National
Organization for Women (Florida Chapter), People for the American Way, Southern
Poverty Law Center, and United Teachers of Dade Gay & Lesbian Caucus at 13-14, In re
Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632
So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994) (No. 82-674).
189 I. at 15.
190 I at 11-13.
191 Interestingly, the proponents of the amendment, in spite of their continued attacks
upon gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, also attempted to avoid the issue in their legal
arguments. In response to briefs, which alleged that the true purpose of their amendment
was to target lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, they offered the following cryptic response:
The Brief for Interested Party American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
Florida, Inc. objects to the ballot title and summary, claiming that the "true
meaning" of the proposed amendment is "unstated." Stripped of its veneer, this
claim is nothing more than an objection that the interpretation of secret purpose
concocted by ACLU is not reflected in the title or summary.
Reply brief for American Family Political Committee of Florida, In Support of
Determination of Compliance with Section 3, Article X, Florida Constitution, and
Compliance with Florida Stat. Section 101.161 at 10, In re Advisory Opinion to the
Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994)
(No. 82-674). Not only was the purpose of the amendment not secret to those who saw the
AFPC's mailings, the AFPC never identified any other group to the court or in its campaign
other than lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.
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measure is: in this case, restricting the rights of gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals.
The court declined to address the constitutional issues because the statute
authorizing the advisory opinion explicitly authorizes consideration only of the
procedural issues. 192 The constitutional difficulties of these measures should be
recognized to be the same as those of other measures. The failure to identify
the targeted group in the initiative should be no more of an excuse than it was
in Ref 1=193 or Hunter.19 4
VI. PRE- AND POSTELECION CHALLENGES
A. Legal Barriers to Pre-Election Challenges
It is arguable that the barriers for measures that deal with constitutional
issues should be higher than with those that deal with statutes or ordinances
because of the importance of the constitutional process. 195 Some have argued
that substantive pre-election challenges are improper because they involve the
rendering of an advisory opinion, they raise constitutional issues that could be
avoided, and they interfere with the legislative process. 196 Some state courts
also refuse to decide constitutional issues in a pre-election challenge. 197
Courts have traditionally refused to issue advisory opinions. 198 Such
192 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (West 1982).
193 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see supra notes 136-46 and
accompanying text.
194 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see supra notes 136-46 and
accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fa. 1984). The court found: "Wle
should require strict compliance with the single-subject rule in the initiative process for
constitutional change because our constitution is the basic document that controls our
governmental functions, including the adoption of any laws by the legislature." Id. at 989.
The court removed from the ballot a measure which sought to restrict the taxing ability of
local governments because it violated the single-subject requirement. Id.
196 See Gordon III & Magleby, supra note 1; see also Plugge v. McCuen, 841 S.W.2d
139 (Ark. 1992) (refusing to rule on the constitutionality of a term limit constitutional
amendment prior to the election).
197 See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994); cf. Brosnahan v. Eu, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) ("As we have frequently observed, it is usually more appropriate to
review constitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after
an election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the
people's franchise, in the absence of some clear showing of invalidity.").
198 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
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reticence is based in part upon the notion of the separation of powers and the
requirement of a case or controversy. 199 Advisory opinions also are criticized
for lacking a factual record, the essence of which promotes abstract, general
decisions. 200 They also violate the doctrine of strict necessity, which
discourages courts from reaching constitutional questions unless they are
unavoidable. 201 There can also be time pressures in pre-election challenges
because some measures reach the court shortly before an election.202 Some
would argue that pre-election reviews of a ballot measure are similar to a
review of a bill prior to its passage by the legislaturOe 3 or that they foster
antijudicial sentiment.2°4 The doctrine of ripeness is also raised as an argument
to avoid pre-election reviews of measures.20 5 The doctrine prevents review
when future facts may arise that would make the adjudication inapplicable. In
pre-election challenges, the most commonly raised argument is that review may
not be necessary because the measure may not pass. There are also questions
about the manner in which a measure may be enforced even if it is passed.206
B. The Need for Higher Scntiny for the Initiative Process
Some courts have stated that the initiative process means that the
procedural requirements must be adhered to more stringently. 20 7 The process is
not subject to gubernatorial vetos, giving the proponents of these measures
more power than the legislative branch of government. They also lack the
inherent checks placed in the legislative process. For example, the check
inherent in a bicameral legislative process forces a measure to survive
legislative staff reviews, public hearings, and rigorous debate within two
separate legislative bodies before passage.208 Various courts have discussed this
"filtering process," which is missing in initiative measures. 2°9 The lack of
these filters contributes to the number of propositions which are poorly drafted
199 See Gordon IH & Magleby, supra note 1, at 305.
2 00 Id.
201 U
2 02 See, e.g., Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151, 157 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J.,
concurring).
203 See Gordon III & Magleby, supra note 1, at 308.
2041d at 306.
205 Id. at 309-10.
2 06 d at 310.
207 See, e.g., Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1984).
208 See Gordon III & Magleby, supra note 1, at 300.
209 See, e.g., Fine, 448 So. 2d at 988.
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and difficult to understand.2 10 In spite of these problems, some would argue
that courts are still too deferential to ballot measures. 21'
Professor Lynn Baker has argued that direct democracry should be subject
to no higher scrutiny than matters approved by elected officials, using public
choice theory to support her thesis.212 Professor Baker concludes that because
it is difficult to empirically demonstrate systemic superiority between direct and
representative democracy, one should refrain from utilizing a priori reasoning
to impose higher burdens upon ballot measures. Because courts have struck
down measures aimed at racial minorities, she concludes that heightened
scrutiny is unnecessary for referenda and initiatives. 213 Her suggestion to
remedy any defects is to either strengthen the doctrine of substantive review of
the legislative product214 or to remedy defects in plebiscitary procedures. 215
It is not necessary to address Professor Baker's arguments point by point
because Professor Eule has done that in a responsive article,216 but certain
points of relevance will be repeated and expanded upon here. First, as
Professor Eule notes, it is not necessary to empirically prove the preference for
representative government because that is the form of government chosen by
the United States Constitution,217 as well as by all fifty states. The inability to
conclusively demonstrate on an empirical basis that plebiscites pose threats to
members of minority groups should not foreclose the ability of scholars and
courts to recognize that which they observe.218 Second, it is disingenuous to
2 10 See Fischer, supra note 21, at 54.
211 See, for example, Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982), in which the
Florida Supreme Court stated that: "The Court must act with extreme care, caution, and
restraint before it removes a constitutional amendment from the vote of the people." Id. at
156. The court upheld an amendment to the "Sunshine" (public disclosure) provisions of the
Florida Constitution. Note that this is the same court that proclaimed in Fine that the
initiative process should be subjected to higher scrutiny. See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.
212 See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrirnation: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 Cm.-Knzr L. Ray. 707 (1991).
213 Id. at 759-66.
214 Id. at 770.
215 Id. at 772-75.
216 Je 'ulian N. Eule, Representative Government: The People's Owice, 67 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 777 (1991).
217 Id. at 778.
218 In concluding his article on plebiscites, Professor Sirico observes:
Reasonable people, however, continue to disagree over the advisability of
permitting plebiscites. Social science studies suggest no clear resolution to the
controversy. Nor do legal arguments that rely on judicial doctrine, inconclusive
behavioral data, and speculation on how certain structures may further
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imply that the dangers to minority groups are simply the elitist musings of legal
academicians. As noted, most of those who have studied the initiative process
have noted the dangers to members of minority groups.219 Of the 139
jurisdictions which presently have sexual orientation antidiscrimination
provisions, the author is unaware of any which were obtained through the
initiative process. The empirical proof may not be conclusive, but the anecdotal
evidence is overwhelming.
The argument for heightened scrutiny of ballot measures does not depend
upon an uncritical acceptance of representative government. Gay, lesbian, and
bisexual leaders have recognized that it simply takes fewer persons and
resources to present to the limited number of elected officials necessary to pass
legislation the significant scientific evidence and personal testimony necessary
to refute emotional, unsupported stereotypes than it is to try to do the same for
millions of voters. In modem elections, which are increasingly conducted with
thirty- and sixty-second "sound bites," it is often not possible to convey the
complex and extensive documentation that counters the propaganda of the
proponents of the anti-gay measures.
Fuither, the opponents of the anti-gay measures certainly believe that the
representative process is more prone to passing such legislation. This belief is
evidenced by their efforts to prohibit legislative bodies from passing such
legislation in the future.220 Anti-gay measures do not simply attempt to
compete with elected officials on an equal basis; they seek to remove elected
officials from the process of considering the issue. In fairness to Professor
Baker, it is not completely clear that she would approve of submitting the
current anti-gay measures to a vote. She may believe that current substantive
judicial review doctrine is sufficient to eliminate them. At least on the pre-
election cases, however, the judicial review process has rendered mixed
results. 221 Courts continue to express grave concern about overturning ballot
measures.
222
constitutional and political ideals. 7he answer must find its source in intuition
infonned by experience.
Sirico, supra note 1, at 676-77 (emphasis added).
219 See supra part IV.A.
220 See infra Appendices A-I.
221 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 22.
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C. The Argwnents for Pre-Election Challenges to Anti-Gay Ballot
Measures
The legal problems, including those of constitutional dimensions that were
outlined above,223 should prevent these ballot propositions from being given
legal effect. The weakest arguments for challenges to referenda exist for those
which are placed on a ballot by a representative body, because they have
already faced a legislative process and thus, have gone through the systemic
checks of that process. Nevertheless, this factor still should not get the ballot
propositions past the significant constitutional hurdles that they should be
forced to overcome. In addition to the First Amendment and Equal Protection
arguments which exist against referenda, it can be argued that the dangers
posed to minorities by direct democracy should suffice to sustain an argument
against them even on the basis of republicanism concepts.224
Initiatives lack even the defense that they were filtered through the
legislative process. They realize the worst fears of critics and those supporters
of ballot measures who recognize the weaknesses of these plebiscites. These
propositions should be struck down on either republicanism, Equal Protection,
or First Amendment grounds. The portions of overtly hostile measures
concerning public schools and libraries also should be struck down because of
the particular First Amendment issues that they raise.
As noted above, there are at least three separate constitutional arguments
that can be made against anti-gay ballot initiatives. 225 On Guarantee Clause
grounds, Justice Hans Linde has proposed a five-part test which should be
employed to determine when a ballot measure violates republican jurisprudence
and therefore needs to be invalidated. 226 Professor Bell has posited a four-part
test to determine when a measure deserves more scrutiny.227 He argues that the
223 See supra part V.A.
2 24 See supra part V.A.2.
225 See supra part V.A.
2 26 Linde, supra note 125, at 41-43.
227 Professor Bell suggests that courts consider:
(1) the history of overt or institutional discrimination to which the minority group
has been subjected; (2) the degree to which the minority group continues to suffer
from discrimination; (3) whether the referendum action increases the difficulty
minorities will experience in overcoming past and/or present discrimination; and
(4) whether the neutral goals sought to be achieved by the referendum could have
been achieved through policies less harmful to minority interests.
Bell, supra note 44, at 26-27 n.94.
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court protection should be strongest when the majority attempts to take away
through the ballot a gain obtained through the representative process. 228 The
California, 229 federal,23 0 and Colorado231 courts, which have found Equal
Protection violations, have established the groundwork for those claims.
Further, Professor Richards would strike all of these measures because they
violate First Amendment principles. 23 2 For those states that do not have
specific pre-election technical review procedures, the courts should provide a
stricter scrutiny on the substantive issues to compensate for the lack of the
filtering process which the legislative process provides.
Those courts that refuse constitutional review prior to an election should
nonetheless carefully review both referenda and initiatives for procedural and
textual defects. As has been noted, the proponents of these measures are
attempting to find the language that is most effective in a campaign. Their
demonstrated willingness to use words to manipulate emotions should demand
the strictest scrutiny of their text, titles, and summaries. 23 3 The right of a
person to not be subjected to discrimination should not depend upon the ability
of a pollster or other campaign strategist to devise the most emotionally
appealing phrase to convince the voters. Stealth proposals must be revealed for
what they are. The Florida Supreme Court has provided some guidelines for
the approach to be taken to these measures in In re Advisory Opinion to the
Attorney General-Restricts Law Related to Discrimination.23 4 The interests at
stake are too important for voters to have to guess about what they are voting.
If all of these standards to assure electoral fairness are not strictly enforced,
then the justifications raised for direct democracy are even further eroded. 23 5
Some would argue that all such remedies can be sought subsequent to an
election. However, the reasons for doing so are insufficiently strong to
overcome the problems raised by these measures. If a court needs more time to
fully consider the issue, it has the discretion to deny that review,23 6 although it
should exercise this discretion with care. Because of the lack of the structural
228 Id. at 26.
229 See Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. S0-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1251 (Cal. Mar. 12,
1992).
230 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-93-773,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11444 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 1994).
231 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
232 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
233 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
234 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
235 See supra part III.A.2.
236 See Gordon IT & Magleby, supra note 1, at 316.
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checks built into the legislative process, reviews of these measures are not
similar to reviewing bills still in the legislature.
The hesitancy of some commentators to support pre-election review is
unwarranted with regard to these anti-gay propositions. 237 Courts render
advisory opinions on the procedural defects of ballot measures,238 and some
have even considered constitutional grounds prior to a vote.239 These measures
present the type of palpable, facial constitutional violations that all courts
should be willing to address. The information that courts will gain by waiting
for an election is insufficient to overcome the damage caused by these
unconstitutional proposals. Delaying an inevitable rejection of an
unconstitutional measure on the grounds of ripeness unduly favors form over
substance. Even an electoral defeat does not stop the proponents of anti-gay
proposals, as is evidenced by the continued efforts in Oregon to bring such a
measure before the voters.24°
Similarly, the facial unconstitutionality of these propositions is not
dependent upon factual nuances. Nonetheless, in Evans v. Romer,241 the
Colorado District Court permitted the state to put on evidence to support its
arguments of a compelling interest. More appropriate for a legislative
proceeding than the type of fact-finding usually done by trial courts, the trial
court engaged in an inquiry which was unnecessary to address the facial
constitutional problems of this initiative.242
These measures present a variety of legal defects. As has been noted, even
those who have written favorably about direct democracy have assumed that the
courts would protect the rights of persons who belong to minority groups.243
When applied to a politically unpopular minority group, the usual judicial
deference given to direct democracy should be abandoned. Even courts that
237 Even Professor Eule, who favors "a harder look" standard of judicial review of
ballot measures, opines that judges should steer clear of pre-enactment review. This is
particularly troubling because he acknowledges that postelection challenges pose a greater
danger to public acceptance because of the appearance of thwarting the will of the majority.
See Eule, supra note 21, at 1585.
238 See In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General-Restricts Laws Related to
Discrimination, 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
239 The Nevada Supreme Court removed an initiative concerning the limitation of
terms that a United States Congressman or Senator may serve from the ballot because it
violated the Qualifications Clauses of the United States Constitution. Stumpf v. Lau, 839
P.2d 120, 126 (Nev. 1992).
240 See supra note 5.
241 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,998 (Colo. Dist. Ct.), aff'd on other grounds,
854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
242 Id.
2 43 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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have been reluctant to prevent ballot measures from reaching the voters have
acknowledged that clearly defective measures should not be permitted.244
In response to the argument that the judicial system would be subjected to
criticism for removing a measure before an election, one should consider the
alternatives. If a court strikes a measure passed by the electorate, the criticism
of the judicial system certainly will not be less. Going through the charade of
an election to pass a measure that cannot withstand legal scrutiny not only
wastes time, energy, and other resources, it also mocks the electoral system it
supposedly honors. Voters are given the option of either choosing what is
constitutionally permissible or having their choice rejected for its illegality.
Further, holding these elections has a harmful impact upon those whom the
courts should be protecting. The controversy and animosity surrounding these
measures has generated violent acts against the groups they target. 245 This
should not be surprising because the attempt to give discrimination an official
sanction simply reinforces the bigoted notion that the persons being denied
protection are worthy of the scorn and abuse they receive. Further, when the
state for much of its history has been a willing partner in endorsing the
discrimination being enacted by the citizenry, it should be diligent in
remediating the harm it has caused.246 The judiciary should acknowledge the
role it has played in creating the unfair stereotypes that lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals must seek to counter in these campaigns and use its discretion to
counter the stereotypes' effects when an appropriate opportunity to do so is
presented.247
244 The Florida Supreme Court stated, long before adopting the current advisory
opinion procedure to which it subjects all current initiative amendments, that a measure
should be struck "when the amendment, if adopted, would palpably violate the paramount
law and would inevitably be futile and nugatory and incapable of being made operative
under any conditions or circumstances." Gray v. Wthrop, 156 So. 270, 272 (Fla. 1934).
q. Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1980) (noting the initiative right,
while closely guarded, does not extend to legislation that violates the United States or
Alaska Constitutions); Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 574 (D.C. App. 1992) (holding
pre-election review of constitutional violations is appropriate in the "truly extreme case").
245 After the passage of Amendment Two, there was a 400% increase in the reports of
harassment and violence against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in Colorado. See Note, supra
note 86, at 1911-12 & nn. 49-53.
24 6 See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1551, 1551-80 (1993); Law, supra note 155; Richards, supra note 118; Rivera, supra
note 175; Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAK L.
REV. 311 (1980-81).
247 For an argument of how sodomy laws contribute to homophobic violence, see
Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1431 (1992). For a
description of the effects of the Utah legislature's discussion of the inclusion of sexual
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Measures that seek to prohibit legislative bodies from passing
antidiscrimination laws in the future are significantly different from other
initiatives. Such initiatives do not simply seek to compete on an equal ground
with representative bodies; they seek to explicitly remove the power of the
elected officials. These measures turn the notion of republican government on
its head. The representative government is prohibited from exerting power to
protect its constituents, even if the constituents can demonstrate pervasive and
invidious discrimination. As the initiatives' proponents have demonstrated, they
wish to remove from the executive and legislative branches of government the
power to provide legal protection on these issues. If the judiciary also refuses
to get involved, the proponents of these measures will have managed to prevent
all three branches of representative government from protecting an unpopular
minority. Such a notion should be offensive to the principles embodied by the
First Amendment, the Guarantee Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. It is
the realization of the worst fears of the persons who have studied direct
democracy and of the founders of this country.
The danger of direct democracy to minority groups is evidenced by the
need, twenty-five years into the modem gay rights movement,248 for scholars
and advocates to respond to ludicrous charges of child molestation and bizarre
sexual practices, such as urine and feces ingestion, offered by these measures'
proponents. 249 On an issue as important as the right to be free from
discrimination, the debate should be principled and based upon rational
discussion of theories, data, and facts propounded by reliable sources. The
charges leveled by the proponents of these measures about an entire group of
persons are a classic example of a bigot trying to stereotype an entire class by
making allegations about the most objectionable behavior arguably engaged in
by a few members of that class. As stated by the court in Citizens for
Responsible Behavior, in reference to the offensive notice distributed by the
initiative's proponents:
It fails utterly to make any distinction between homosexuals based on
actual conduct or deportment, tarring all homosexuals-male and female
alike--with the same brush of bizarre practices, gross promiscuity, and wilful
exposure to probable disease.... All that is lacking is a sack of stones for
orientation in the state's hate crimes law, see Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against
Lesbians & Gay Men, 1994 UTAHL. REV. 209.
248 Most modem lesbian and gay leaders point to the disturbances at the Stonewall Inn
in Greenwich Village on Iune 27, 1969, as the symbolic beginning of the modern lesbian
and gay movement in the United States, even though there were organizations and
individuals working for liberation prior to this event. See Cain, supra note 246, at 1552.
249 See supra note 112.
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throwing.25 0
It is precisely this type of irrational prejudice that the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to prohibit, and that is based upon notions that the First
Amendment should not allow.
VII. CONCLUSION
Conservative organizations around the country are sponsoring ballot
measures which seek to restrict the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.
The courts must be diligent to protect constitutional principles when dealing
with these measures. These initiatives pose serious threats to First Amendment,
Guarantee Clause, and Equal Protection principles. Furthermore, the wording
of the amendments and the campaigns surrounding them use factual
inaccuracies and distortions in an attempt to prevent lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals from obtaining protection from their elected representatives against
unfair discrimination. Courts must stringently enforce technical requirements
and apply constitutional analysis to these measures. In order to avoid bitter,
divisive campaigns which will cause increased polarization, the courts should
strike these initiatives before they are placed on the ballot.
250 Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 658-59
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. SO-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1251 (Cal. Mar.
12, 1992).
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APPENDIX A: ARIZONA'S PROPOSED
INITIATIVE1
PROPOSED INITIATIVE AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
TEXT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT
Be it enacted by the people of Arizona:
The following amendment to the Constitution of Arizona,
amending Article II, Section 13 to become valid when approved by the
majority of the qualified electors voting thereon and upon proclamation of
the governor:
Section 13. Equal privileges and immunities
(1) No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of
citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or
immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally
belong to all citizens or corporations.
(2) NEITHER THIS STATE, THROUGH ANY OF ITS
BRANCHES OR DEPARTMENTS, NOR ANY OF ITS
AGENCIES, POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS,
MUNICIPALITIES OR SCHOOL DISTRICTS, SHALL
ENACT, ADOPT OR ENFORCE ANY STATUTE,
REGULATION, ORDINANCE OR POLICY WHEREBY
PEDOPHILE, HOMOSEXUAL, LESBIAN OR
BISEXUAL ORIENTATION, ARE THE BASIS OF, OR
ENTITLE ANY PERSON OR CLASS OF PERSONS TO
STATUS OR CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION. THIS
PARAGRAPH SHALL BE IN ALL RESPECTS SELF-
EXECUTING.
1 The initiatives in the following appendices were collected by the author and the
original copies remain on file with him.
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APPENDIX B: IDAHO'S PROPOSED INITIATIVE
REVISED VERSION OF IDAHO CITIZENS ALLIANCE'S
ANTI-GAY INITIATIVE
Proposed Title 67, Chapter 80, Idaho Code
Section 67-8001: PURPOSE OF ACT. The provisions of Title 67,
Chapter 80 of the Idaho Code are enacted by the people of the State of
Idaho in recognition that homosexuality shall not form the basis for the
granting of minority status. This chapter is promulgated in furtherance of
the provisions of Article 3, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho.
Section 67-8002: SPECIAL RIGHTS FOR PERSONS WHO ENGAGE
IN HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED. No agency,
department, or political subdivision of the State of Idaho shall enact or
adopt any law, rule, policy, or agreement which has the purpose or effect
of granting minority status to persons who engage in homosexual behavior,
solely on the basis of such behavior; therefore, affirmative action, quota
preferences, and special classifications such as "sexual orientation" or
similar designations shall not be established on the basis of homosexuality.
All private persons shall be guaranteed equal protection of the law in the
full and free exercise of all rights enumerated and guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution, the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and federal and state
law. All existing civil rights protection based on race, color, religion,
gender, age, or national origin are reaffirmed, and public services shall be
available to all persons on an equal basis.
Section 67-8003: EXTENSION OF LEGAL INSTITUTION OF
MARRIAGE TO DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS ON HOMOSEXUAL
BEHAVIOR PROHIBITED. Same-sex marriages and domestic
partnerships are hereby declared to be against public policy and shall not
be legally recognized in any manner by any agency, department, or
political subdivision of the State of Idaho.
Section 67-8004: PUBLIC SCHOOLS. No employee, representative, or
agent of any public elementary or secondary school shall, in connection
with school activities, promote, sanction, or endorse homosexuality as a
healthy, approved or acceptable behavior. Subject to the provisions of
federal law, any discussion of homosexuality within such schools shall be
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age-appropriate as defined and authorized by the local school board of
trustees. Counseling of public school students regarding such students'
sexual identity shall conform in the foregoing.
Section 67-8005: EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS. No agency,
department or political subdivision of the State of Idaho shall expend
public funds in a manner that has the purpose or effect of promoting,
making acceptable, or expressing approval of homosexuality. This section
shall not prohibit government from providing positive guidance toward
persons experiencing difficulty with sexual identity. This section shall not
limit the availability in public libraries of books and materials written for
adults which address homosexuality, provided access to such materials is
limited to adults and meets local standards as established through the
normal library review process.
Section 67-8006: EMPLOYMENT FACTORS. With regard to public
employees, no agency, department or political subdivision of the State of
Idaho shall forbid generally the consideration of private sexual behaviors as
nonjob factors, provided that compliance with the Title 67, Chapter 80,
Idaho Code is maintained, and that such factors do not disrupt the
workplace.
Section 67-8007: SEVERABILITY. The people intend, that if any part of
this enactment be found unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall survive
in full force and effect. This section shall be in all parts self-executing.
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APPENDIX C: MAINE'S PROPOSED INITIATIVE
To the 118th Legislature of the State of Maine:
In accordance with Section 18 of Article IV, Part Third of the Constitution
of the State of Maine, the undersigned electors of the State of Maine,
qualified to vote for Governor, residing in Maine, whose names have been
certified, hereby respectfully propose to the Legislature for its
consideration the following entitled bill:
AN ACT TO LIMIT PROTECTED CLASSES
UNDER THE MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
The full text of this act is printed below on this petition. The question on
the ballot will read as follows:
Do you favor the changes in Maine law concerning the limitation
of protected status to the existing classifications of race, color,
sex, physical or mental disability, religion, age, ancestry, national
origin, familial status, and marital status proposed by citizen
petition?
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine:
5 M.R.S.A. Section 4552-A is enacted to read:
Section 4552-A - Limitation of protected class status
Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter or any other
provision of law, protected classes or suspect classifications under
state or local human rights laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, or
policies, shall be limited to race, color, sex, physical or mental
disability, religion, age, ancestry, national origin, familial status,
and marital status. Any provision of State or local law, rule,
regulation, ordinance or policy inconsistent with the preceding
sentence is hereby void and enforceable. This section shall not
limit the power of the Legislature to add to the list of protected
classes or suspect classifications enumerated in this section through
future legislation.
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APPENDIX D: MISSOURI'S PROPOSED
INTATIVE
Neither the State of Missouri, through any of its branches, departments
or agencies, nor any of its political subdivision, including counties,
municipalities and school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, order, regulation, rule, ordinance, resolution or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bi-sexual activity, conduct or orientation shall
entitle any person or class of persons to have or demand any minority
status, protected status, quota preference, affirmative action or claim of
discrimination.
This section shall be in all respects self-executing. This section is
severable, and should any portion hereof be found unconstitutional, the
remainder shall in all respects remain in force.
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APPENDIX E: NEVADA'S PROPOSED
INITIATIVE
THE MINORITY STATUS AND CHILD PROTECTION ACT
The Constitution of the State of Nevada is amended by creating a new
section to be added to and made a part of Article 1. The new section shall
be known as "The Minority Status and Child Protection Act" and will read
as follows:
The People of the State of Nevada do enact as follows:
Section 21: MINORITY STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUALITY
PROHIBITED
(1) The People of the State of Nevada find that inappropriate
sexual behavior does not form an appropriate basis upon
which to construct a minority or class status relation to
civil rights. To identify oneself as a person who
participates in or who expresses openly a desire for
inappropriate sexual behavior, such as homosexuality, fails
to constitute a legitimate minority classification. The
People establish that objection to homosexuality based
upon one's convictions is a Liberty and Right of
Conscience and shall not be considered discrimination
relating to civil rights by any unit, branch department or
agency of state or local government. The People further
establish that in the State of Nevada, including all political
subdivisions and units of state and local government,
minority status shall not apply to homosexuality; therefore,
affirmative action, quotas, special class status or special
classifications such as "sexual orientation," "sexual
preference," "domestic partnerships" or similar
designations shall not be established on the basis of
homosexuality.
(2) Children, students and employees shall not be advised,
instructed or taught by any government agency, department
or political unit in the Stat [sic] of Nevada that
homosexuality is the legal or social equivalent of race,
color, religion, gender, age or national origin; nor shall
public funds be expended in a manner that has the purpose
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of [sic] effect of promoting or expressing approval of
homosexuality.
(a) The State of Nevada, political subdivisions
and all units of state and local government shall not
grant marital status or spousal benefits on the basis
of homosexuality.
(b) The State of Nevada, political subdivisions
and all units of state and local government, with
regard to public employees, shall generally
consider private lawful sexual behaviors as non-job
related factors, provided such factors do not disrupt
the work place and such consideration does not
violate subsections (1) and (2).
(c) Though subsections (1) and (2) are
established and in effect, no unit of state or local
government shall deny to private persons business
licenses, permits or services otherwise due under
existing statutes; not deprive, nullify, or diminish
the holding or exercise of any rights guaranteed by
the Constitution of the State of Nevada or the
Constitution of the United States of America.
(d) Though subsections (1) and (2) are
established and in effect, this section shall not limit
the availability in public libraries of books and
materials written for adults which address
homosexuality, provided access to such materials is
limited to adults and meets local standards as
established through the existing library review
process.
(3) The PEOPLE INTEND, that if any part of this enactment
be found unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall survive
in full force and effect. This Section shall be in all parts
self-executing.
(4) Any person residing in the State of Nevada or non-profit
entity doing business in this State has standing to bring suit
to enforce the provision and policies of this Act.
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APPENDIX F: WASHINGTON'S PROPOSED
IN-TAT
IN1IATVE 608
AN ACT relating to prohibiting special rights for homosexuals; adding
new sections to chapter 49.60 RCW[;] and declaring an emergency.
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Washington
NEW SECTION. See. 1.
THE EQUAL RIGHTS. NOT SPECIAL RIGHTS ACT.This act
shall be known and cited as the Equal Rights, Not Special Rights
Act.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 2.
A new section is added to chapter 49.60 RCW to read as follows:
PROTECTING CITIZEN'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS. Neither the State of Washington, nor its political
subdivisions, shall deny any right expressly guaranteed by the
Constitution of the State of Washington or the Constitution of the
United States of America.
Persons who commit acts of violence against the person or
property of others should be prosecuted and appropriately punished
in order to protect law-abiding citizens and to ensure the guarantee
of equal justice for all.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 3.
A new section is added to chapter 49.60 RCW to read as follows:
ENSURING EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. The people
find that equal protection of the law, not special rights, is a
fundamental principle of constitutional government and is essential
to the well-being and perpetuation of a free society.
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The people further find that there is a legitimate and compelling
state interest in ensuring equal protection of the law for all citizens
and in preventing special rights based on any homosexual,
bisexual, transsexual, or transvestite status, preference, orientation,
conduct, act, practice, or relationship.
The people further find that there is a legitimate and compelling
state interest in ensuring that the rights of parents to control the
education of their children and that the sincerely-held values and
beliefs of citizens regarding homosexuality, bisexuality,
transsexuality, or transvestism are not denigrated or denied by the
public schools and that homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexuality,
or transvestism are not presented, promoted or approved as
positive, healthy or appropriate behavior.
The people further find that "the duty of all teachers" as required
in RCW 28A.405.030 "to endeavor to impress on the minds of
their pupils the principles of morality, truth, justice, temperance,
humanity and patriotism" and "to teach them to avoid idleness,
profanity and falsehood" is an indispensable prerequisite for
providing a sound education, maintaining a virtuous and ethical
society, and guaranteeing the rights of all citizens.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 4.
A new section is added to chapter 49.60 RCW to read as follows:
PROHIBITING SPECIAL RIGHTS FOR HOMOSEXUALS.
Neither the State of Washington, nor its political subdivisions,
including counties, cities, towns, and school districts, shall by any
means or instrumentality, enact or enforce a policy whereby any
homosexual, bisexual, transsexual, or transvestite status,
preference, orientation, conduct, act, practice, or relationship shall
be a basis for a person to maintain any special classification or
privilege; minority status; quota preference; affirmative action
right; legal standing; public benefit; marital, spousal, parental,
familial or domestic privilege, advantage, entitlement, benefit,
position, or status; claim of discrimination; or special right or
protection.
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A school, through any employee, volunteer, guest, or other means
or instrumentality, shall not present, promote or approve
homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexuality, or transvestism, or any
such conduct, act, practice, or relationship, as a positive, healthy,
or appropriate behavior or lifestyle. As used in this section,
"school" means any common school of the [S]tate of Washington.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 5.
CONSTRUCTION CLAUSE. The provisions of this act are to be
liberally construed to effectuate the policies and purposes of this
act. In the event of conflict between this act and any other
provision of law, the provisions of this act shall govern.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 6.
SEVERABILITY CLAUSE. If any provision of this chapter or its
application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter or the application of the provision to other
persons or circumstances is not affected.
NEW SECTION. Sec. 7.
EMERGENCY CLAUSE. This act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, orals, or safety, or the
support of the state government and its existing public institutions,
and shall take effect immediately.
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INITIATIVE 610
A Legislative Act by the People of the State of Washington.
AN ACT relating to how homosexuality will be viewed in law and in the
public policy of the State of Washington. In this Act, homosexuality is
defined as sexual desire for a person of the same gender, as determined by
the individual's willingness to be openly self-identified with those desires,
or sexual activity with individuals of the same gender.
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Washington
New Section Section 1:
THE MINORITY STATUS AND CHILD PROTECTION ACT
This act shall be known and cited as The Minority Status and Child
Protection Act.
New Section Section 2:
A new section is added to chapter 49.60 RCW to read as follows: THE
SPECIAL RIGHT OF MINORITY STATUS BASED ON
HOMOSEXUALITY PROHIBITED.
The People find that inappropriate sexual behavior does not
form an appropriate basis upon which to construct a minority or
class status relating to civil rights. To identify oneself as a person
who participates in or who expresses openly a desire for
inappropriate sexual behavior, such as homosexuality, fails to
constitute a legitimate minority classification.
The People establish that objection to homosexuality based
upon one's convictions is a Right of Conscience and shall not be
considered discrimination relating to civil rights by any unit,
branch department or agency of state or local government.
The People further establish that in the State of Washington,
including all political subdivisions and units of state and local
government, minority status shall not apply to homosexuality;
therefore, affirmative action, quotas, special class status or special
classifications such as "sexual orientation," "sexual preference,"
"domestic partnerships" or similar designations shall not be
1994]
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established on the basis of homosexuality.
No public funds shall be expended in a manner that has the
purpose or effect of promoting or expressing approval of
homosexuality. This provision shall not limit the availability in
public libraries of books and materials written for adults which
address homosexuality, provided access to such materials is limited
to adults and meets local standards as established through the
existing library review process.
With regard to public employees, no agency, department or
political subdivision of the State of Washington shall forbid
generally the consideration of private lawful sexual behaviors as
non-job related factors, provided that such consideration does not
violate the provisions and purposes of this Act and that such
factors do not disrupt the workplace.
New Section Section 3:
A new section is added to chapter 28A. 150 RCW to read as follows:
THE PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM SHALL NOT PROMOTE OR
EXPRESS APPROVAL OF HOMOSEXUALITY.
The People establish that no person representing the state
educational system as an employee, student, volunteer or guest
shall undertake any activity that would in any manner advise,
instruct, teach or promote to any child, student or employee that
homosexuality is a positive or healthy lifestyle, or an acceptable or
approved condition or behavior. The educational system is to be in
full compliance with chapter 49.60 RCW.
New Section Section 4:
A new section is added to chapter 26.33 RCW to read as follows: FOSTER
PARENT STATUS AND ADOPTION BY PERSONS PARTICIPATING
IN HOMOSEXUALITY PROHIBITED.
The People find that there is a compelling state interest in
placement of minor children, where at all possible, in sound,
married, male-female households and that such children must never
be placed in households where homosexuality is present in any
manner whatsoever. Any person participating in homosexuality
shall not be an adoptive, foster or placement parent.
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The People further establish that, upon the dissolution of a
marriage in which one of the natural parents or other legal
classification of parent is participating in homosexuality, the minor
child, wherever legally possible, will be placed in the custody of
the parent not participating in homosexuality. Where both parents
are unqualified, custody shall be awarded to the next closest natural
relative; such as, grandparents, brothers or sisters, aunts or uncles
and so forth. All consideration is to the well being of the minor
child and it is the policy of the State of Washington that sound
natural family relationships are the most important initial
consideration that will maintain that well being. Where this is not
possible, an adoptive or foster parent situation is to be ensured.
Every appropriate court and government agency in the State of
Washington shall enforce the provisions of this section and, at all
placement or custody proceedings, shall enter and maintain a
written finding that the prospective custodial, foster or placement
parent does not participate in homosexuality.
New Section Section 5:
A new section is added to chapter 26.04 RCW to read as follows:
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PERSONS OF THE SAME GENDER
PROHIBITED AND NATURAL GENDER DEFINED.
The People establish that same-gender marriages and domestic
partnerships are hereby declared to be against public policy and
shall not be legally recognized in any manner by any agency,
department or political subdivision of the State of Washington.
The State of Washington recognizes that the gender that is
established at the conception of all persons is the only and natural
gender of that person for the duration of their life. Any physical
alternations to the human body do not affect the natural gender,
known at birth or before, of any resident in the State of
Washington. Any same-gender marriage or gender alteration
obtained or recognized outside the State of Washington shall not
constitute a valid or legal marriage or gender within the State of
Washington.
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New Section Section 6:
A new section is added to chapter 49.60 RCW to read as follows:
ALL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PROTECTED FOR EVERY
CITIZEN.
In the State of Washington and its political subdivisions, no
Unit, agency, or department of government shall deny to private
persons business licenses, permits or services otherwise due under
existing statutes, nor deprive, nullify, or diminish the holding or
exercise of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of
Washington or the Constitution of the United States of America.
New Section Section 7:
SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION CLAUSE.
The PEOPLE INTEND that, if any part of this enactment be
declared unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the
remaining parts shall survive in full force and effect. This
enactment shall in all parts be self-executing. In the event that a
conflict arises between this legislation and any other provision of
law, the policies and purposes of this Act shall govern.
New Section Section 8:
LEGAL STANDING.
Any person residing in the State of Washington or non-profit
entity doing business in this state has standing to bring suit to
enforce the provisions and policies of this Act.
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APPENDIX G: COLORADO AMENDMENT TWO(ENJ.OINED)
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado:
Article 2, of the Colorado Constitution is amended by the addition of Sec.
30, which shall state as follows:
NO PROTECTED STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUAL, LESBIAN OR
BISEXUAL ORIENTATION. Neither the State of Colorado, through any
of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall
constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected
status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be
in all respects self-executing.
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APPENDIX H: FLORIDA'S PROPOSED
INITIATIVE (STRUCK BY FLORIDA SUPREMECO=R)
TITLE:
LAWS RELATED TO DISCRIMINATION ARE RESTRICTED TO
CERTAIN CLASSIFICATIONS
SUMMARY:
Restricts laws related to discrimination to classifications based upon race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, ethnic background,
marital status or familial status. Repeals all laws inconsistent with this
amendment.
FULL TEXT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF FLORIDA THAT:
Therefore, to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States,
the people of Florida, exercising their reserved powers, hereby declare
that:
1) Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of
Florida is hereby amended by:
a) inserting "(a)" before the first word thereof and,
b) adding a new sub-section "(b)" at the end thereof
to read:
"(b) The state, political subdivisions of the state,
municipalities or any other governmental entity
shall not enact or adopt any law regarding
discrimination against persons which creates,
establishes or recognizes any right, privilege or
protection for any person based upon any
characteristic, trait, status or condition other than
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
handicap, ethnic background, marital status or
familial status. As used herein the term "sex"
shall mean the biological state of being either a
male person or a female person; "marital status"
shall mean the state of being lawfully married to a
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person of the opposite sex, separated divorced,
widowed or single; and "familial status" shall
mean the state of being a person domiciled with a
minor, as defined by law, who is the parent or
person with legal custody of such minor or who is
a person with written permission from such parent
or person with legal custody of such minor."
2) All laws previously enacted which are inconsistent with
this provision are hereby repealed to the extent of such
inconsistency.
3) This amendment shall take effect on the date it is approved
by the electorate.
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APPENDIX I: CINCINNATI'S PROPOSITION(EN.TOINED)
We, the undersigned, Electors of the City of Cincinnati, Ohio, petition
your honorable body to forthwith provide by ordinance, for the submission
to the Electors of said City of Cincinnati, the following proposed
Amendment to the charter of the City, to wit:
AMENDMENT
TITLE:NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED
UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
An amendment to the Charter of the City of Cincinnati to adopt a
supplementary Article XII to prohibit the City of Cincinnati from
enacting, adopting, enforcing or administering any ordinance,
regulation, rule of policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian
or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes,
entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any
claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment.
TEXT: Be it resolved by the people of Cincinnati that a new Article
XII be added to the Charter of the City of Cincinnati to prohibit the
City from granting special class status based upon sexual
orientation, conduct or relationships, to read as follows:
ARTICLE XII
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not
enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or
policy which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,
status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a
person with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status,
quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the City
Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation,
rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the
foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
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APPENDIX J: OREGON'S MEASURE NINE
(RFIECTED BY ELECTORATE)
OREGON: MEASURE NINE TO AMEND CONSTITUTION
This referendum measure, which was defeated in the general election,
November 3, 1992, included the following proposed amendment to the
Oregon constitution:
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
PARAGRAPH 1. The Constitution of the State of Oregon
is amended by creating a new section to be added to and
made a part of Article I and to read:
SECTION 41 (1) This state shall not recognize any
categorical provision such as "sexual orientation", "sexual
preference", and similar phrases that includes
homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or masochism. Quotas,
minority status, affirmative action, or any similar concepts,
shall not apply to these forms of conduct, nor shall
government promote these behaviors.
(2) State, regional and local governments and their
properties and monies shall not be used to promote,
encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism
or masochism.
(3) State, regional and local governments and their
departments, agencies and other entities, including
specifically the State Department of Higher Education and
the public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for
Oregon's youth that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia,
sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and
perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged and
avoided.
(4) It shall be considered that it is the intent of the people
in enacting this section that if any part thereof is held
unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall be held in force.
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